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This document is the UK report of a European project which explored the measurement of migrants’ integration. 
The project, Migrants’ Integration Territorial Index (MITI) was funded by the European Union as part of its 
INTI programme on the integration of Third Country nationals. The project aimed to gather available statistical 
data on themes relevant to integration and to explore the possibility of developing an index of integration which 
could compare progress towards integration in the different regions of an individual state. 
The project was led by a team from the Dossier Statistico Immigrazione (IDOS) in Rome and also included 
partners from France, Portugal and Spain. The partners met five times during the course of the project to discuss 
and compare views about the meaning of integration and to compare data availability and analysis between the 
different countries. Much relevant data was collected and analysed in the course of the project, including data 
broken down by region which had not previously been analysed in this form. It was not, however, possible to 
come to an agreement between the partners on the question of the construction of an index. The lead partner, 
IDOS, maintained that it was possible to produce a meaningful result by producing an overall index from the 
data available in Italy and their own national report describes this. Other partners, however, including the UK 
team, did not feel that this was possible both because of the lack of relevant data in their own countries and due 
to broader concerns about the limitations of such an index. It was therefore decided that each partner would 
present the results of their research according to the data availability in their own country and their views of the 
methodological issues surrounding the construction of an index.  
In the report which follows, therefore, while we include the introduction, methodology and conclusions 
produced by the lead partner, we have also written our own versions of these sections. These both explain the 
reasons for the position we have taken and highlight the key conclusions in relation both to the specific UK case 
and the more general issue of the measurability of integration. In order to minimise confusion to the reader, the 
sections describing the UK research are designed to be self-contained. The text written by the lead partner is 
placed in boxes with the methodology and conclusions as appendices.
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Integration: a challenge for Europe 
Identifying and implementing efficient integration policies has become a very important issue on the agenda 
of European states. Europe is characterised by ever greater cultural diversity and needs to draw on the 
wealth of its collective experience to develop more adequate resources in order to respond to the challenge 
of immigration. The permanent nature of the post-war immigration flows, and the diversity of their countries 
of origin, show clearly that, with the passage of time, immigrants generally become permanent residents or 
citizens of the country in which they live, while at the same time large numbers of children are born to 
‘foreigners’ in EU countries. Today there are around 28 million foreign nationals in Europe, of which two 
thirds are from third countries and almost as many who have acquired citizenship of one of the member 
states, which means that around one in ten residents of Europe are of non-European origin.  
In this context of sharp differences, the models of coexistence developed during the 1970s have become 
less relevant and it is crucial to try out processes of integration which can promote more effectively the 
construction of a single and cohesive social fabric in which everyone can feel a sense of belonging and 
acknowledge others on the basis of equality of rights and duties. 
Assimilation, a melting pot, gastarbeiter (guestworker) systems, are terms and concepts for 
understanding and promoting integration which are inherited from the past, often referring to historical 
situations which are very different both from each other and from the contemporary situation. The 
globalisation of goods and services has had profound impacts on the dynamics of migration and has even 
changed the meaning of words such as immigrant, citizen, culture, borders, nation, identity, equality, rights.  
Today, having studied and evaluated the traditional models on which countries with longer traditions of 
immigration (France, UK, Holland and Germany for example) based their migration policies, and whose 
experience is highly valuable, Europe is debating the best way to produce effective integration so that it can 
be developed through an understanding of the limitations which have been revealed in the earlier national 
models. 
This is not a simple goal, both because of the complexity of the issue and the resistance of member 
states to delegating crucial aspects of migration policy to the EU. Each one arrogates to itself the right to 
decide, largely autonomously, its policies in relation to immigration and the cultural and socioeconomic 
integration of foreigners in its own country, in spite of attempts to harmonise these policies into a more 
coherent and homogeneous framework. 
In particular, it now seems crucial not merely to promote policies which can bring together these diverse 
groups and allow them to interact through dynamic intercultural policies in order to influence this diverse 
context and to rebuild it in a spirit of reciprocity. It is also important to develop authoritative instruments to 
measure the effectiveness and adequacy of these policies, based on the actual local context. 
  
Territorial analysis and integration policies 
It is with this perspective that the research project MITI (Migrants’ Integration Territorial Index) was 
developed. Co-financed by the European Union through its INTI Programme, it began in September 2006 
for an 18 month period and involved a partnership of five member states. The project was led by the Centro 
Studi e Ricerche IDOS in Rome, Italy, and the other participating countries were France (Centre d’Etudes et 
de Recherches, CERI, Paris); the United Kingdom (Middlesex University, London); Spain (Association 
Salud y Familia, Barcelona) and Portugal (International Organization for Migration (IOM), Lisbon, with the 
support of the research centre Nùmena). A second Italian partner, the Rome-based cooperative Europolis, 
took charge of the administration of the project. 
Using a common framework of statistical indicators organised into thematic areas, for each of these 
areas every partner explored the possibility of developing an index. The MITI project involved a comparative 
study of the different levels of socio-economic integration of immigrants from Third countries across 
different geographical areas (regions, and major metropolitan areas) in each partner country. The aim was 
to provide policy makers with a research-based tool to inform the decision making and governance of the 
complex phenomenon of integration, providing also a transnational base of comparison.  
6The project was based on the Italian experience, which had been developed within the Consiglio 
Nazionale per l’Economia e il Lavoro (CNEL), the National Council for the Economy and Labour. Through 
the ONC (National Organisation for Coordination) of policy for the integration of foreigners, CNEL has for the 
last six years commissioned IDOS to produce an annual report on Indices of Integration of immigrants in 
Italy.  A system of overall indices is constructed from the range of available statistical indicators which are 
brought together through a standardised point system. The experience over several years has provided the 
opportunity to attempt to measure the potential for socio-economic integration of immigrants in the various 
areas, regions and provinces of the country.  
The MITI project is thus distinct from other community initiatives in two fundamental ways: in the regional 
break down of its analysis within each partner country and in the specific comparative method used in the 
construction of the statistical indicators. Both of these represent a real contribution to research in this area. 
In addition we have included a more detailed examination of the most important national groups in each 
partner country. It has, however, exposed structural limitations both in the research instruments (the 
indicators) and in our understanding of the meaning of integration and thus in the possibility of transnational 
comparisons of the results.  
The regional level of analysis is certainly of great interest for a study of this kind, since it allows us to 
evaluate which regional or administrative areas within each country offer the highest level of social and 
economic integration of third country nationals compared to others. It thus measures the level of local 
preconditions which might promote the possibility of immigrants’ integration, at least in relation to these two 
crucial aspects. It involves, therefore, a scale comparing the structural potential for integration in each region 
within a state. Within certain limits, it also allows us to draw parallels with similar regions of the other states 
involved in the research on the basis of the same methodology. The case studies of metropolitan areas (the 
capital cities, with the exception of Spain which focused on the extremely interesting area of Barcelona) 
allowed us to compare, using the same indicators, the situation of some of the most important European 
cities and of their respective hinterlands.  
Aims and limitations of the research 
The territorial analysis here adopted imposed some cautions. In particular, the necessity of identifying data 
disaggregated by region for each of our chosen indicators, and in each country involved in the research, 
significantly affected the composition of the common grid. In many cases, highly relevant indicators which 
should in theory have been included in the common system (for example crime rates, the rate of school 
enrolment or the level of union membership) could not be used because the relevant data was not available 
in all countries disaggregated by region as required by the project. It was therefore necessary for all partners 
either to omit them or to use data which, though relevant to the phenomenon, measured it more indirectly 
and were not the ideal ones. These were nevertheless the only ones on the subject which were 
disaggregated regionally available for the majority of partners. 
In both cases the common grid of indicators was weakened both in its extent (the incompleteness of its 
range) and intensity (the reduction in its comprehensiveness meant it was less able to explore the 
complexity of the phenomenon of integration). 
This situation confirms the necessity of reading the results of such research with caution, as having an 
indicative value in measuring the phenomenon rather than being an exhaustive objective measure. This 
warning would, however, be necessary even if we were able to develop a grid based on a complete set of 
ideal indicators. Integration is, by its very nature, a complex and multifaceted phenomenon which involves 
aspects of the lives of immigrants which can be revealed only though qualitative investigation and cannot 
therefore be understood fully through purely quantitative instruments such as the ones used here. 
In spite of these inevitable limitations in the research and the consequent warnings about how to read and 
evaluate the results obtained by each partner, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge the value of the 
work achieved at the transnational level, in order that it can be transferred, developed and adapted in future 
studies at the European level. Widening the basis of comparison and enriching the analysis of single 
indicators at national and regional level could be an important step towards understanding the importance of 
the local dimension of integration. 
7
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Integration has been high on the political agenda in Britain as well as the European Union during the current 
century as governments have attempted to manage immigration and its social and economic implications. With 
the adoption of the Common Basic Principles (CBP) on migrant integration in 2004 by EU states, member states 
were encouraged to establish goals based on clear indicators of integration. The MITI project, part of the 
broader European Union INTI programme 
1
provided the opportunity to explore the different components of 
integration with researchers from other European states and to explore the types of indicators which might be 
useful in understanding the concept and in developing policies to promote integration. The project was also 
important in its exploration of the local dimension of integration, an element which is widely recognised to be 
crucial both in relation to policy making and in terms of how people see themselves as belonging.  
The experience of migration and the policy context of the UK has been very different from that of most of the 
partners in this project and this offered a rich source of debate. These differences, however, also raised a number 
of practical and conceptual issues which both enriched our comparative discussions and made it difficult to 
develop a common understanding and methodology in relation to the measurement of integration. The longer 
history of migration in the UK means that understandings of integration are very different from those in some 
other European states. As the children and grandchildren of post-war migrants to Britain grow up as British 
citizens, British society has become increasingly diverse in ethnic, religious and cultural terms. These groups 
are embedded in all aspects of national life – for example politics, the professions, the mass media – although 
structural inequalities remain. This has led to a policy focus on equalities between different ethnic groups.  As 
well as moves to make the acquisition of British citizenship more conditional, the key targets of policies of 
integration and social cohesion have included British citizens of migrant background born in Britain whose 
economic and social marginalisation may also make them disaffected from what are claimed to be ‘British’ 
values. This issue also highlights the complexity of the process of integration.
Furthermore, the significance and meaning of the regional dimension varies between states. In Britain, the major 
regions for which data is disaggregated have little significance in terms of administrative or policy-making 
institutions, while individuals are unlikely to identify themselves as belonging at this level. There are regional 
assemblies for Wales and Scotland and Northern Ireland (the first two recent and the last with a complex 
relation to the UK national state) but the English regions, apart from London, have no specific policy making 
bodies. The United Kingdom is a highly centralised state in which local government (borough, country and 
district councils) have relatively limited powers in relation to issues relevant to integration, although they can 
influence the way in which policies are implemented. Greater London has only recently acquired its own Mayor 
and elected assembly which has great symbolic significance but little policy making power. In relation to policy, 
therefore, the national level (meaning here predominantly UK) is of overwhelming importance while – 
especially in England - the more local level, city, borough or local London area, may be what is meaningful to 
people in terms of their daily lives and sense of attachment and belonging.  
These two issues have implications for the statistics available on issues relevant to integration. Much official 
data are collected on the basis of ethnicity rather than nationality and cannot therefore be used to assess the 
situation of migrants. In addition, much of this is available only at national rather than regional level. Thus 
statistics on the indicators identified during the course of the project were in many cases unavailable.  
As well as the issue of data availability, the project raised conceptual issues concerning the definition and 
measurability of integration. Integration is, as all partners in the project agreed, a contested term, while the 
process of integration is multi-dimensional, involving both immigrants and nationals. Some of these aspects 
                                                          
1
 INTI is a European Union (EU) funding programme for preparatory actions promoting the integration in the EU member 
states of people who are not citizens of the EU. 
8(such as the extent of labour market integration) are, in principle at least, measurable while others, such as a 
sense of belonging, are more difficult to quantity and cannot be understood through official statistical data. 
Furthermore, many of the data which are available, while clearly relevant to integration, have a complex and 
sometimes ambiguous relation to it. It is not, therefore, always possible to place these data on a linear scale in 
which high values can be taken as signifying stronger progress towards integration. 
A further issue raised within the project was the variety of migratory experience between and within different 
national groups. The INTI programme concerns the integration of non-EU nationals but the averaging of data 
for this group as a whole can hide this diversity. It was thus decided to select a small number of national case 
studies. In the UK case, we chose groups with very different histories of migration and settlement in Britain: 
Australians, Bangladeshis, Chinese and Poles. The latter are in fact EU citizens following Poland’s Accession to 
the EU in 2004. The statistics gathered here suggest that their experience is in many ways more similar to that of 
the average for non-EU migrants than that of British nationals, thus raising questions about the usefulness of the  
categories ‘EU’ and ‘non-EU nationals’. 
The results of our analysis are different from those of some of our partners, in particular from the model 
proposed by the Italian partners. We have not been able to collect the range of relevant data in the appropriate 
form to construct a meaningful index of integration, even if we take only a limited aspect of integration related 
to socioeconomic position. As well as the issue of data availability, we suggest that there are conceptual 
problems in the construction of such an index. These make it important to reiterate that the results need to be 
treated with extreme caution and that no clear-cut policy conclusions may be drawn from it. These issues are 
discussed further in the methodological section.  
We believe, however, that we have collected a range of data which enriches our understanding of the situation 
of non-nationals living in the United Kingdom and can thus point to some implications for integration. This is 
the first time that such data has been systematically collected and analysed at the regional level. The data 
indicate significant spatial variations in migrant experience and suggest the importance of exploring the local 
dimension of integration.
  
9&	
,


4	
		
		

Mass migration to Britain is often thought of as having started in the period after the Second World War when 
processes of economic and political restructuring brought significant new migratory flows from former colonies.  
Immigration has, however, a long history largely as a result of conquest by others (for example the Romans, 
Normans and Danes) and of Britain’s own imperialist ventures. Small numbers of people from the colonies have 
settled in Britain from at least the sixteenth century. Britain has also accepted refugees, including the Huguenots – 
Protestants fleeing Catholic France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - and revolutionaries from 
Europe including both Marx and Lenin.  The first mass immigration was from Ireland, Britain’s oldest colony, 
particularly in the wake of the Famine of 1846. Irish people are Britain’s largest ethnic minority and continue to 
suffer social and economic disadvantage (Hickman and Walter, 1997; Tilki et. al. 2008). With the expansion of 
international trade in the nineteenth century settlements of people, including from China, Somalia and the 
Caribbean, developed in sea ports such as London, Liverpool and Cardiff. 
Britain has an uneasy relationship with its immigration history. Holmes (1988) suggested that official accounts have 
been unwilling to admit the extent of immigration since it interfered with myths of nationhood based on a common 
culture. More recently, however, diversity has been claimed in the name of a particular form of Britishness. The 
White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven produced in 2002 suggested that, ‘British nationality has never been 
associated with membership of a particular ethnic group’ (Home Office, 2002: 10). At the same time, 
governments have suggested that there are limits to the ‘tolerance’ of the British people and attempted to restrict the 
numbers of new entrants.  
  
Immigration control is only 100 years old, but has become normalised as part of the ‘common sense’ in which 
discussion about migration is framed. The first Act barring entry to Britain was the Aliens Act, 1905. Although free 
movement had prevailed before this, the state had periodically expelled groups or individuals. Jews, the main 
targets of the Act, had been periodically welcomed and deported since they first entered Britain with the Norman 
invasion in 1066 and there were expulsions of black people, citizens of the Empire, from Elizabethan England. The 
immediate trigger for the Aliens’ Act was the inflow of Jews fleeing persecution in Russia and Eastern Europe. 
The Act’s passage also reflected the changing balance of class interests in Britain as popular citizenship developed 
with the expansion of the franchise and the development of welfare and employment rights. This required 
boundaries around those eligible to benefit and the exclusion of the ‘undeserving’ (Cohen et. al., 2002). The 
contradictory accusations that immigrants both take ‘our’ jobs and take advantage of welfare (Jones, 1977: 78) 
have been a continuing element of anti-immigration rhetoric. 
Migration policy has continued to be largely restrictive, although the targets of control have changed. Migration 
has, however, played a crucial social and economic role in Britain. The next major phase of migration came 
after the Second World War from which Britain emerged on the winning side but diminished economically and 
politically. The process of decolonisation was hastened by the war and threatened to weaken further Britain’s 
position as a leading world power. British policy-making in this period was dominated by conflicting 
imperatives. The maintenance of superpower status required reconstructing relations with the Commonwealth. 
This new relationship was embodied in the Nationality Act, 1948 which gave rights of entry and citizenship to all 
citizens of British colonies and the Commonwealth. This symbolic universal equality masked the deep 
racialisation of the British state which dominated immigration policy in the following period. Britain needed to 
import labour for post-war reconstruction but in the much quoted phrase of the Population Commission Report 
1949, the only immigrants welcomed ‘without reserve’ were to be of ‘good human stock and not prevented by 
their religion or race from intermarrying with the host population and becoming merged in it’ (cited in Paul, 
1997: 128). Thus when Commonwealth citizens attempted to take up their citizenship rights within Britain they 
were met with hostility. The arrival of the Empire Windrush at the port of Tilbury in 1948 carrying 492 
Jamaicans seeking work was described by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee as an ‘incursion’ (Holmes, 1988: 
257). Active recruitment, however, took place among the refugees and displaced people of Europe. Around 
200,000 stateless Poles were granted settlement in Britain following the war, including veterans from the Polish 
10
Army in Exile based in London. The Irish, however, continued to be the main source of labour immigration, 
while there was large scale migration from other parts of Europe, include Italy and Portugal. 
The next period of immigration policy was dominated by a growing distinction between the rights of citizens 
from the Old Commonwealth (countries such as Australia and New Zealand which were colonies of settlement 
by Europeans) and the New Commonwealth (Africa, Asia, the Caribbean) through the racialisation of 
nationality laws.  In spite of these controls by the 1960s a settled population was becoming established. Indeed, 
the threat of controls precipitated further immigration and forced migrants to make the choice to remain 
permanently. Restrictions on entry were combined with the development of policies to promote equality, for 
example through a series of Race Relations Acts which prohibited discrimination in employment on grounds of 
race and ethnicity. This distinction between promoting good ‘race relations’ and an immigration policy 
discriminates ever more strictly on the grounds of nationality has been a continuing feature of British policy 
(Sales, 2007). 
As Britain joined the European Common Market (later the European Union) in 1973, the government attempted 
to shift the pattern of immigration flows towards EU citizens. Official policy aimed at ending primary migration 
from outside the EU except in exceptional circumstances. Migration from the Commonwealth, however, 
continued to grow, as British welfare services (especially health) became increasingly dependent on this form of 
labour (Raghuram and Kofman, 2002) 
The end of the Cold War and subsequent economic and political crises produced a ‘new migration regime’ in 
Europe (Koser and Lutz, 1998). The globalisation of production, trade and finance which had been accelerating 
since the 1970s through multinational corporations and the growing influence of international financial 
institutions had brought growing inequalities. These both precipitated migration from poorer countries and 
increased demands for labour within the richer states. The development of global cities (Sassen, 1991), 
including London, led to the expansion of both high-level employment associated with leading global 
companies and of low-status casualised labour in services such as cleaning, hotels and catering and domestic 
labour. The conditions which intensified labour migration also brought an increase in refugee movements. 
Indeed, the boundaries between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration are extremely blurred (Bloch, 1999).  
Immigration to Britain in the 1990s thus encompassed a growing diversity both in relation to country of origin 
and in the motive for migration (predominantly labour, family migration and asylum). Many have settled and 
taken out citizenship and while others use the UK as a stage towards another country seen to have better 
prospects, such as the United States, or for a shorter period to earn money and return home (Kofman et. al., 
2008). Channels for entry for labour migrants were simplified and work permits extended for longer periods so 
that skilled workers could accumulate enough years to apply for indefinite leave to remain and citizenship. This 
group included a growing proportion of women, with the percentage increasing between 1996 and 2000 from 
22.45 per cent to 33.5 per cent due in part to labour shortages in education and health. Migration for low skilled 
work was also facilitated through sector-based schemes in food processing and hospitality which brought in 
workers largely from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and some Asian countries (Bangladesh, 
Philippines and Thailand). Family reunion became the main form of entry for women migrants during this 
period (Kofman and Sales, 1998) which was especially important from areas of earlier migration such as the 
Indian sub-continent. 
Table 1 shows a doubling of the inflow of migrants in the decade from 1993, with both continuity and change in 
the countries of origin. Australians remain the largest single group, reflecting the continuation of the traditional 
short term migration of young people through working holidays, while inflows form China, previous relatively 
small, became the second largest with the establishment of a ‘new migration regime’ (Pieke, 2004) following 
economic and political change there. This group is highly diverse, including both privileged migrants and those 
entering clandestinely who often work in highly dangerous conditions (Sales et. al, 2008). Other countries 
producing substantial increases in migration include the Philippines and South Africa.  
In 2000, the government attempted to challenge the growing contradiction between official policy of ‘zero’ 
migration and Britain’s dependence on migrant labour. Acknowledging the social and economic value to Britain 
of migration, it announced policies to ease restrictions on labour migration, particularly for the highly skilled. 
With the Accession to the EU of eight Eastern European countries, the government attempted to replace 
unskilled migrants from outside the EU with these new EU citizens. It allowed free access to the labour market 
before this became a right under EU law, although social rights were limited. Migration from these countries 
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was much greater than expected: according to official figures, between May 2004 and December 2007 766,000
people applied to the Workers Registration Scheme which was established in 2004 to monitor the employment 
of this group of workers. Many more worked without registering (CRONEM, 2007).  Poles are by far the largest 
single group (66 per cent for the whole period but 71 per cent in the 4th quarter 2007) followed by Lithuanians 
and Slovaks. This migration was expected to be temporary and no provision was made for their social needs, 
such as schooling. There is, however, growing evidence that many intend to stay long term or permanently 
(CRONEM 2007; Zaronaite and Tirzite 2007) while family migration has been growing (Ryan et al, 2007). In 
contrast to the period of post-colonial and Irish immigration, Eastern Europeans have increasingly taken up 
employment in regions such as East of England and East Midlands with a minority in London. Following a 
hostile media campaign, the government decided to restrict access to the labour market for Bulgarians and 
Romanians, though they may apply for work permits. 
This migration has contributed to an even more diverse population at the start of the twenty first century. 
According to a report by a leading demographer (Salt, 2007) the foreign-born population rose from over 4 
million to over 6 million in the decade to 2007 and comes from a huge variety of countries: 28 per cent from the 
European Union (25 countries), 40.3 per cent from the New Commonwealth, 5.8 per cent from the Old 
Commonwealth and 25.9 per cent from other countries.  Migration of skilled labour and students has also 
resulted in larger numbers of dependants who also have the right to work. Another contributing factor to 
diversity is secondary migration of new EU citizens (often of refugee origin, for example Somalis, Congolese, 
Tamils, Afghanis) from the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries.  Some nationalities are highly 
differentiated. For example Portuguese include many born outside Portugal (Angola, Mozambique, Brazil) and, 
in thus fall into a variety of ethnic categories, ‘white Europeans’, ‘black African’, ‘mixed’ and ‘other’.  Table 2 
on the foreign population is based on nationality rather than country of birth, and since many migrants acquire 
citizenship, it underestimates the inflow of migrants during this period. Nevertheless, it shows major increases 
in numbers as well as in the major groups. The largest group of foreign nationals is still from Ireland, with those 
from India remaining in second place but Polish people have increased from insignificant numbers at the 
beginning of the decade to third place in 2005. The table also reveals the continuing importance of migration 
from the United States and France (fourth and fifth place respectively). This migration has remained largely 
‘invisible’ in British discourse in relation to immigration which has tended to problematise certain groups, 
including New Commonwealth migration and more recently asylum seekers and Eastern Europeans. 
Table 1 - 1992 - 2001 - United Kingdom - Inflows of foreign population by nationality (thousands) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Australia  10.0  11.0  9.0  12.0  13.0  14.0  27.2  26.4  23.8  33.5 
China  1.0  1.0  2.0  5.0  3.0  1.0  5.8  15.1  18.6  18.5 
France  9.0  4.0  3.0  12.0  11.0  21.0  15.0  13.6  14.7  16.2 
Germany  6.0  4.0  8.0  5.0  8.0  8.0  9.1  9.2  11.4  16.1 
India  4.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  10.0  6.2  10.3  17.2  16.0 
South Africa  1.0  2.0  1.0  3.0  4.0  6.0  11.7  12.0  14.2  13.1 
United States  11.0  14.0  15.0  11.0  15.0  11.0  21.1  16.9  14.0  13.1 
Philippines  1.0  1.0 ..  1.0  2.0  1.0  0.1  5.4  6.1  11.6 
New Zealand  6.0  6.0  7.0  8.0  9.0  7.0  14.5  13.4  12.4  11.6 
Pakistan  6.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  8.0  5.0  4.2  6.6  9.5  9.6 
Greece  3.0  8.0  3.0  3.0  6.0  9.0  12.5  10.3  5.5  5.6 
Malaysia  5.0  5.0  8.0  10.0  5.0  10.0  5.1  4.1  5.5  5.4 
Korea  2.0  1.0  1.0  3.0  4.0 ..  1.7  1.4  4.3  5.3 
Japan  4.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  8.0  7.1  7.9  7.3  4.8 
Bangladesh  2.0  4.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  5.0  1.7  3.2  3.1  4.5 
Other countries  42.0  42.0  58.0  60.0  64.0  66.0  71.1  81.0  93.1  81.5 
Total  113.0  118.0  132.0  150.0  164.0  182.0  214.0  237.0  260.5  266.2 
adjusted figures*  175.0  179.2  206.2  228.0  224.2  237.2  287.3  337.4  379.3  373.3 
Notes: (*) adjusted figures include short-term migrants (including asylum seekers) who actually stayed longer that one year. 
Source: International Passenger Survey (from OECD Sopemi Report 2007) 
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Table 2 - 1996 - 2005 - United Kingdom - Stock of foreign population by nationality (thousands) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ireland  441  446  448  442  404  436  403  367  368  369 
India  128  110  139  149  153  132  145  154  171  190 
Poland .. .. .. .. ..  34  24  34  48  110 
United States  105  104  120  123  114  148  100  120  133  106 
France  53  54  74  68  85  82  92  102  95  100 
South Africa  22  24  39  50 ..  68  64  95  92  100 
Australia  50  62  50  55  75  67  75  73  80  79 
Pakistan  78  68  69  73  94  82  97  83  86  95 
Germany  53  59  75  85  64  59  68  70  96  100 
Portugal  28  27  38  44  29  58  85  88  83  85 
Italy  85  77  89  80  95  102  98  91  121  88 
Zimbabwe .. .. .. .. ..  20  35  51  73  68 
Bangladesh  43  63  69  78  55  70  61  48  69  64 
Philippines  12  15  12 ..  20  27  32  54  52  51 
Ghana .. .. .. .. ..  31  27  35  30  38 
Other countries  836  957  985  961 1 154 1 171 1 178 1 277 1 260 1 392 
Total 1 934 2 066 2 207 2 208 2 342 2 587 2 584 2 742 2 857 3 035 
Notes: (*) figures are rounded and not published if less that 10,000. 
Source: Labour Force Survey (from OECD Sopemi Report 2007) 


Table 3 - Workers Registration Scheme - Nationality of approved applicants, by quarter and year of application  

Year Quarter Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total 
 2004*   Total    8,255    1,860    3,620    8,670    19,270    71,025    13,020   160    125,880  
 2005   Total    10,575    2,560    6,355    12,955   22,990    127,325   22,035   170    204,965  
 2006   Q1    1,865    390    1,435    2,560    4,235    31,920    4,305    55    46,765   
   Q2    2,045    340    1,600    2,790    4,470    38,125    5,490    40    54,905   
   Q3    2,220    420    1,835    2,265    4,340    45,465    6,260    50    62,855   
   Q4    2,215    325    2,190    1,880    4,015    46,980    5,695    40    63,345   
 2006   Total    8,345    1,475    7,060    9,490    17,065    162,490   21,750   185    227,865  
 2007   Q1    1,820    270    1,965    1,835    3,740    35,775    4,840    45    50,285   
   Q2    1,790    210    2,075    1,625    3,675    37,120    5,570    40    52,105   
   Q3    1,865    245    2,160    1,420    3,465    38,680    5,750    50    53,635   
  % of Q3   3%    0%    4%    3%    6%    72%    11%    0%    100%   
Notes: (*) May to December 2004 
Source: Accession Monitoring Report 2007 
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Policy towards the integration of migrants has moved higher on the political agenda over the past decade in both 
Britain and the European Union. Another research project within the INTI programme, MIPEX (Migrant 
Integration Policy Index), has sought to develop an index of policies concerned with integration in order to 
compare progress across the European Union. This looks at policies in six areas, comparing actual policies with 
an ‘ideal’, or what it calls ‘best practice’. According to its latest report, legally-resident third-country nationals  
in the UK ‘benefit from slightly favourable labour market access, long-term residence, family reunion, and 
access to nationality policies. Political participation policies score around halfway to best practice. Anti-
discrimination laws and policies are particularly strong and have improved since 2004.’ This assessment, which 
is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 provides a relatively positive view of Britain’s policies. The report focuses 
on formal policies but implementation in Britain is subject to high levels of discretion on the part of 
immigration officers and an official culture which tends to stereotype particular national groups and may lead to 
discrimination (Sales, 2007). 
  
Recent policy development in relation to integration has taken place within the context of an overall policy of 
‘managed migration’ which is based on maximising what the government defines as ‘British interests’. These 
have been perceived  in increasingly narrow terms, with increasing selectivity in the rights accorded to migrants 
both in relation to entry and to the terms on which they may reside in Britain. This has created large groups with 
insecure or temporary status who are not expected to integrate. This shift has taken place within the context of a 
growing public hostility towards immigration. As the MIPEX report noted, “Britons increasingly rank 
immigration and race as their top policy concerns. Anxieties over Islamism and terrorism have also fuelled 
public debates on integration.” As well as increasing pressure for restrictive migration policy, these concerns 
have themselves been created in part by immigration policy itself. The growing visibility of asylum seekers, for 
example, is a product of policies which have separated them from mainstream support structures (Sales, 2002).  
These views also reflect the separation between the issues of immigration and ‘race relations’ in official and 
popular discourse. A recent survey found that whereas over two-thirds of Britons find diversity to be enriching 
and supported anti-discrimination measures, they were less open in relation to migrants. Unlike in most 
countries, only a minority of Britons (42.7%) support a migrant's right to family reunion and only just over a 
third of those polled believe migrants should be able to naturalise easily (Eurobaromter, 2006) 
Figure 1 - UK scores on the 6 dimension of 
MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) 
Source: Integration Index, 2007 
(http://www.integrationindex.eu)
Although managed migration was officially signalled in 2000, the New Labour government had attempted to 
shift the direction of policy since it came to office in 1997.  At this time there was a widespread perception of a 
crisis in immigration policy particularly in relation to asylum and a major priority was an attempt to restore 
control over borders and to select those migrants who should enter and the terms of their settlement. Although 
Labour had made a symbolic break with the past in recognising the value of migration, the ‘mildly progressive 
elements’ were ‘swamped’ in an agenda that emphasised the reassertion of national state control over 
immigration procedures (Flynn, 2005: 305) 
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There are three major components to managed migration: labour migration, controls and citizenship. Labour 
migration has become more selective on the basis of both nationality and skills. While opportunities have been 
opened up for those with the skills deemed necessary for the British economy and for new EU citizens, others 
have suffered restrictions on their social rights and length of residence. The decision to allow new EU citizens 
access to the labour market was accompanied by the ending of schemes which admitted non EU citizens for 
short term employment. An increasing array of controls has been implemented for ‘unwanted’ migrants (Cohen, 
2006; Bloch and Schuster, 2005). These include both physical controls on entry and increased monitoring on the 
status of migrants resident within the UK. Border controls have been strengthened with increased use of 
technology such as digital readings of irises and finger printing and checks to prevent people without 
appropriate documents from travelling (Geddes, 2000).  A widening range of people have been brought into the 
policing of immigration status, including transport operators, service providers and even voluntary agencies 
working with asylum seekers. Citizenship has taken on greater ideological and practical significance, with new 
citizens invited to celebrate their new status in ceremonies introduced in 2002. They must, however, meet a 
growing range of conditions, including passing a language test (English or Welsh) and showing ‘knowledge of 
the UK’ which is assessed through an on-line test involving 24 questions based on Life in the United Kingdom: 
a journey to citizenship (Home Office, 2004a). Some questions are quite obscure, and most current British 
citizens would be unlikely to pass without considerable preparation. There is a failure rate of 31.3% (MIPEX, 
2007).  New citizens are required to swear an oath, to which the government added a new section in 2002, 
highlighted below: 
I [swear by Almighty God] [do solemnly and sincerely affirm] that, from this time forward, I will give 
my loyalty and allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second her Heirs and Successors and to 
the United Kingdom. I will respect the rights and freedoms of the United Kingdom. I will uphold its 
democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British 
citizen. 
While restricting the rights to settle (and therefore to integrate) of many groups, a more active policy of 
integration for those allowed to remain has been promoted. A variety of packages have been developed for those 
granted refugee status. Participation in the labour market is, however, seen as the main route to integration, with 
labour migrants largely expected to manage their own integration. Specific measures to support labour migrants 
limited and fragmented. Although the state helps them to get their skills and qualifications recognised, it does 
not set national policy targets to further integration or allow migrants equal access to vocational training and 
study grants (MIPEX, 2007). 
 British policy has also been shifting towards a concern with social cohesion, including with British-born 
citizens from minority ethnic communities as well as migrants. Muslims, in particular have been criticised for 
lack of involvement in mainstream society and ‘community leaders’ exhorted to denounce extremism. In June 
2006, a  new Commission on Integration and Cohesion was established to consider ‘how local areas can make 
the most of the benefits delivered by increasing diversity’ but also how they can respond to the problems which 
could arise because of ‘segregation and the dissemination of extremist ideologies’.
2
   
Official policy towards integration has thus been contradictory. The focus on controlling immigration 
undermines integration, problematising outsiders and thus reducing the possibility of co-existence. The 
increased conditionality of rights, not just to citizenship but also to secure residence and to other social rights, 
undermines the process of integration. Asylum seekers have been particular objects of control, with a segregated 
system of social support while their claim is heard which inhibits their engagement with mainstream society. 
This delays the integration of those ultimately granted refugee status and thus the right to benefit for the new 
integration packages. 
The following sections present an overview of the main rules and policies in relation to the issues relevant to 
integration identified within the MIPEX project. The main sources are listed at the end of this section and these 
should be consulted for more detailed information and to ensure that information is up to date.  
                                                          
2
 Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government speaking at the launch of the Commission.  
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Depending on their immigration status, migrants must wait for different lengths of time to become eligible for 
indefinite leave to remain (long-term residence). A spouse need wait only two years, whilst the period is five 
years for migrant workers, refugees and EU nationals exercising their right to free movement. Students and any 
other legal resident must wait 10 years to be eligible. Irregular migrants who can prove habitual residence can 
apply after 14 years.  
Former students can count half their time studying in the UK towards the time requirement but refugees cannot 
count any of their time waiting for an asylum decision.  
A long-term residence permit gives migrants the right to accept most jobs, in the same way as EU nationals. 
They are also entitled to social security, social assistance, healthcare and housing support. 
According to MIPEX long-term residents are ‘slightly’ secure under the law. They are protected from expulsion 
on some grounds, though they can be expelled regardless of how long they have lived in the UK and whether or 
not they are a minor. 
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Naturalisation is not an entitlement. Citizenship is granted only to those who can demonstrate that they satisfy 
certain legal requirements and if the Home Secretary ‘thinks fit’. These include that applicants must:
 Be aged 18 or over  
 Be of sound mind (see below for those not of sound mind) 
 Intend to continue to live in the UK, or to continue in Crown service, the service of an international 
organisation of which the UK is a member or the service of a company or association established in the UK 
 Can communicate in English (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic) to an acceptable degree 
 Have sufficient knowledge of life in the UK (tested on the basis of the publication “Life in the UK”) 
 Be of good character (have shown respect for the rights and freedoms of the United Kingdom, observed its 
laws and fulfilled duties and obligations as a resident of the United Kingdom). 
 Have lived in the UK for a minimum of 5 years before you apply (or 3 years in the case of those applying 
on the basis of marriage or civil partnership to a British citizen). 
  
Those aged 65 or over or with a long term physical or mental condition that prevents them from learning 
English or being tested on knowledge of life in the UK, may not have to meet these requirements. 
  
Those who have naturalised can lose their citizenship for various reasons, including proven fraud in acquiring 
nationality or if they are considered an actual threat to public policy or national security. The UK, allows dual 
nationality, attaining ‘best practice’ on this measure according to MIPEX. 

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Legislation covers three of the grounds that directly affect migrants - race/ethnicity, religion/belief and, with 
limited exceptions, nationality - as well as gender, age and disability. Complainants receive financial assistance.  
They must, however, go through lengthy civil and administrative procedures, in which NGOs (legal entities 
with a legitimate interest in defending equality) have little role. Furthermore, specialised equality agencies 
cannot engage in proceedings on behalf of a victim.  
The Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), established by the Equality Act 2006 and operational 
from October 2007, brings together the Commission for Racial Equality, Disability Rights Commission and 
Equal Opportunities Commission. It will be able to instigate proceedings in its own name and assist victims 
through independent legal advice and investigations.  
According to the MIPEX report, anti-discrimination law is the UK's greatest area of strength. The UK scores 
third out of the EU-15.
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The main rules for those people ‘subject to immigration control’ (i.e. non-EEA citizens who do not have 
Indefinite Leave to Remain) wishing to enter for the purpose of family reunion “with a view to settlement” are 
as follows: 
Spouses or partners  
 The applicant must be married to or the civil partner (including unmarried or same-sex partner) of a person 
who: 
- a. is (legally) present and settled in the United Kingdom (e.g. with limited leave to enter or remain), or: 
- b. has the right of abode in the UK (i.e. British citizenship) or indefinite leave to enter or remain  
 The parties to the marriage must have met 
 Each of the parties must intend to live permanently with the other  
 There must be adequate accommodation for the parties and any dependants without recourse to public funds 
 The parties must be able to maintain themselves and any dependants adequately without recourse to public 
funds 
 The applicant must hold a valid UK entry clearance for entry in this capacity 
In the case of 1b above, and if the applicant has sufficient knowledge of the English language and life in the 
UK, s/he may be granted indefinite leave. Otherwise the applicant is admitted for an initial period not exceeding 
2 years (which can be extended or transformed into indefinite leave subject to a number of conditions). If the 
marriage breaks down before two years, the spouse may lose the right to remain. 
Immigration rules do NOT allow entry clearance, leave to enter or leave to remain if: 
 Either partner is under the age of 18 
 The marriage or civil partnership is polygamous 
 Unmarried partners are in a consanguineous relationship with one another  
Children 
Those seeking leave to enter or remain as the child of a parent, parents or relative present and settled (or being 
admitted for settlement)  must: 
 have both parents present and settled in the UK (or one parent if the other is dead; or that parent has sole 
responsibility for the child upbringing; or there are serious and compelling considerations which make 
exclusion of the child unsuitable). 
 be under the age of 18 
 not be leading an independent life (e.g. married, civil partner) 
 be accommodated adequately by the parent/relative without recourse to public funds 
 be maintained adequately by the parent/relative without recourse to public funds 
 hold a valid UK entry clearance for entry in this capacity 
The child is given indefinite leave to remain if the parents have indefinite leave; or limited leave if the parents 
have limited leave. Family members have the same rights as their sponsor to education and employment, but not 
to social assistance and housing. 
According to MIPEX the UK is only halfway to best practice on this measure since spouses, minor children, 
dependent relatives and adult children must meet onerous conditions.  
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Rights to access the labour market for the main categories of migrant are as follows: 
European Union citizens (except Bulgaria and Romania)  
 Full right to seek and take up employment and to enter UK for work. 
Bulgarian and Romanian citizens 
 May seek work permit or enter under temporary schemes for low-skilled workers 
Labour migrants from outside the European Union  
A new five-tier immigration system aimed at rationalising the previous complex set of more than 80 routes of 
entry for work and study was introduced in 2005.  This is based on a points system (PBS) with  points based on 
academic qualifications, previous earnings and age. Bonus points are available for those who have previously 
worked or studied in the United Kingdom. The tiers are as follows 
 Tier 1: for the highly skilled, e.g. scientists or entrepreneurs who may enter to seek work and to remain 
indefinitely. This replaces the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme. 
 Tier 2: other skilled workers with a job offer, eg nurses, teachers, engineers. Employers must apply for a 
work permit to fulfill a specific post. Companies must register to become approved sponsors. Work permits 
can be renewed for up to five years, after which permanent settlement may be granted. 
 Tier 3: low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour shortages, eg construction workers for a 
particular project.  This tier is now restricted to Romanians and Bulgarians who previously entered via the 
Sectors Based Scheme and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme. All existing low-skilled migration 
schemes for workers from outside the EU are being  phased out from January 2007.
 Tier 4: students. Non-EU students are automatically granted permission to take up part-time work on entry, 
and may work for a year on completion of their studies.
 Tier 5: youth mobility and temporary workers, eg working holiday makers or musicians coming to play a 
concert.  
Only temporary settlement is permitted for the last three tiers. 
Permit-free employment  
Long Term Permit-free employment 
Entry clearance will be granted for 12 months in the first instance and may be extended for a further 3 years. 
 Media representatives
 Sole representatives of businesses
 Private servants of diplomats and domestic workers who have been employed under the same roof of the 
employer for at least a year before the application
 Overseas government employees
 Ministers of religion, missionaries and members of religious orders
 Operational ground staff of overseas airlines
 Patrials admitted on the basis of Ancestry (Commonwealth nationals with British-born grandparents)
(continues next page) 
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Short Term Permit-free employment 
 Au pairs 
 Teachers and language assistants 
 The Science and Engineering Graduate Scheme 
The Scottish parliament has also established its own ‘Fresh Talent: Working in Scotland Scheme’ which permits 
short term permit-free employment to certain groups. 
Family reunion  
 Legally resident spouses are entitled to enter employment 
Asylum seekers  
 Following an EU ruling, asylum seekers awaiting a decision are entitled to apply for permission to take up 
employment after one year.  
According to MIPEX the labour market provisions score halfway to best practice. They enjoy equal access to 
employment in most sectors to EU citizens, but not to self-employment. Once they find jobs, migrants enjoy 
favourable workers' rights such as the right to join trade unions and to change their employer, job or profession 
after less than one year of legal employment. 
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UK Citizens must place themselves on the electoral register in order to vote in elections and referenda. Those 
aged 16 or over may register and can then vote in all elections on reaching the age of 18 
Commonwealth and Irish Citizens. Citizens of a Commonwealth country, a British Overseas Territory or a 
Crown Protectorate (the Channel Islands or the Isle of Mann) or of Ireland living in the UK who are aged 16 or 
over may register to vote and can then vote in all elections on reaching the age of 18 
EU Citizens.  Citizens of one of the 27 European Union (EU) countries aged 16 or over can register to vote in 
the UK. At age 18, EU citizens can vote in local and European elections in either their home country or the UK. 
Non-EU Citizens. Non-EU citizens (other than the above) cannot vote in either national or local elections.
All migrants may join political parties and form associations.  
According to MIPEX Electoral rights score halfway to best practice. The UK has attained best practice on 
political liberties. 
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JCWI (2006) Immigration, nationality and refugee law handbook London: JCWI.  
MIPEX (Migrants Integration Policy Index), 2007 - www.integrationindex.eu 
OECD (2007) International Migration Outlook, SOPEMI Report 2007 
UK Border Agency – Home Office  - www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk  
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The original aim of the MITI project was to explore the development of an index of integration, using a 
common framework of indicators representing different aspects of the integration process. As the introduction 
by the lead partner explains (see page 5), this was based on methodology used in research commissioned by 
CNEL, the Italian National Council for the Economy and Labour. This used available statistical data to compare 
the average situation of migrants in different regions of Italy (see for example CNEL, 2007). From the outset, 
however, it was clear that this methodology could not simply be adopted by the other partners. This was due 
both to differences in the availability of data in the partner countries and the ways in which it was produced as 
well as broader concerns about whether and how such data could be analysed and used to construct a 
meaningful index.  
As a first step, it was necessary to develop a common understanding of the meaning of integration and its 
various components. Following discussion at the international meetings of the project teams and a review of 
relevant literature and policy documents by each partner, the project partners adopted a common working 
definition of integration (see box on page 23). Based on this definition, we attempted to identify relevant 
indicators which might be used as a proxy for integration, or rather for some aspects of it. It was recognised that 
it was not possible to measure many of those aspects which we felt were important due to the unavailability of 
relevant data. Moreover, other elements of the integration process were intangible and could not be measured 
through quantitative data.  It was also necessary to resolve the question of which group was relevant in relation 
to integration, and integration policies, in other words to define the meaning of ‘immigrant’ for the purposes of 
the project. 
 Following agreement on a set of indicators, each partner searched for relevant data in their own country and the 
list of agreed indicators was reviewed and modified on the basis of the results of this data collection exercise. It 
was thus an iterative process in which conceptual and methodological problems were continually debated 
together with the results of the data collection and the problems encountered in securing relevant data.  
Much of the discussion at the project meetings concerned the methods to be employed in standardising the data 
in order to place it on a common scale; and the possibility and desirability constructing an overall index of 
integration through adding the results for the various indicators.  Only a limited time was therefore available for 
discussion of international comparisons based on the data collected, and this aspect of the project could be 
developed in future work. In the following sections we first discuss briefly the meaning of integration and some 
issues concerning its measurement. We then discuss the definitions adopted within the project and the indicators 
which were identified.  
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The issue of the terms under which migrants are incorporated, or integrated, into the ‘host’ state is complex and 
contested, reflecting national traditions of citizenship and histories of migration as well as the socioeconomic 
context in which it takes place. The concept on integration has its origin in Durkheim’s notion of ‘solidarity’ 
which referred to the general relationship of individuals to society (Schnapper, 2007) but is now generally taken 
to refer to the process of absorption of ‘outsiders’ - migrants – into an established social order. Indeed, the 
notion of ‘social cohesion’ is increasingly distinguished from integration, with the former referring to ‘diversity’ 
(including ethnic) within the local population, and the latter to migrants (see for example the report of 
Commission on Integration and Social Cohesion, 2007). This implies that migrants are to be integrated into a 
society of which they are not seen as full members (legally or socially) at least in the initial stages and whose 
culture and norms they were not involved in constructing. In the case of colonial migration, they are constructed 
as subordinate.  The notion of ‘national values’ hides the dominance of particular languages and cultures which 
may be a product of histories of conquest. As Favell observed (2001:5) ‘When political actors and policy 
intellectuals talk about ‘integration’, they are inevitably thinking about integration into one, single, indivisible 
(national) ‘state’ and one simple, unitary (national) ‘society’’. British colonialism, which involved crushing or 
subverting pre-existing social structures, has often been justified in the name of promoting modern and 
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‘progressive’ values. The development of citizenship within modern states has thus counterposed ‘us’, 
epitomising civilised values, to ‘them’, the outsiders who needed to be tamed.  
The issue of the terms on which migrants were to be incorporated arose earlier in Britain than elsewhere in 
Europe as a result of its longer history of migration. It was not until the aftermath of the second world war and 
mass migration from the Commonwealth, however, that the issue of integration became established on the 
political agenda. This migration was initially expected to be temporary but as established communities 
developed, their role in British society became a pressing issue. Migrants were initially expected to assimilate to 
the norms and culture of the ‘host’ society.  Thinking about integration became more complex as it became clear 
that many migrants were not prepared to assimilate into the ‘host’ society but retained distinct cultural, religious 
and linguistic traditions and transnational ties with their homeland. Moreover, racism and discrimination 
prevented the unproblematic assimilation of migrants and their children into British society, with inequalities 
based on ethnicity become established in relation to employment, housing and other social indicators. A series 
of Race Relations legislation, initiated in 1968, outlawed discrimination in employment although they did little 
to tackle the roots of these inequalities. Although national policy continued to promote the view that integration 
takes place primarily through the labour market (Soysal, 1994), various forms of multicultural policies were also 
adopted which promoted the importance of acknowledging and valuing diversity (Castles and Davidson, 2000). 
These were implemented primarily at local level by individual local authorities or schools (Gilborn, 1995) and 
were often criticised as being superficial and based on static and conservative notions of ‘culture’ (Yuval Davis, 
1997).  It was in the field of refugee integration, a growing issue during the 1990s, that the government started 
to address integration more directly. It commission research on this issue (Carey Wood et. al., 1995, Castles et. 
al., 2001) although the policy measures developed were limited. 
In the context of the called ‘war on terror’ there have been increasingly strident attacks on multiculturalism, 
particularly aimed at Muslims, and a growing concern with the promotion of ‘British values’. The path to 
integration and citizenship has involved increasing obligations in relation to behaviour and knowledge.  
Integration is thus a contested and complex process in which expectations about the attitudes and behaviour of 
the various actors (immigrants, nationals, the state, service providers) have been shifting and often conflict. 
Nevertheless, with the increasing importance of immigration within Europe, the concept of integration has 
become embedded in official discourse within the EU as well as individual states (D’Angelo, 2006). 
Policymakers need a ‘descriptive and umbrella term to give coherence – at least on the surface - to a set of often 
conflicting immigration policies and, more generally, to the attempt to manage a multicultural society’ Favell 
(2001: 13). This involves establishing definitions of integration on which such policies can be based.
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In developing definitions of integration, policy makers at EU and state level have drawn heavily on academic 
research both directly through commissioning reports and indirectly through the way in which the general 
literature has informed their thinking.  A first step towards an EU definition of integration was the European 
Commission’s ‘Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment’ of June 2003 (Commission of 
the European Communities (2003). This defined integration as:
a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third 
country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant. This 
implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the formal rights of 
immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility of participating in 
economic, social, cultural and civil life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental 
norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, without having 
to relinquish their own identity.
The communication was followed by a report for the European Commission “Benchmarking of Immigrant 
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Integration” by researchers at ERCOMER in the Netherlands (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003).
3
 This 
distinguished two major elements: 
 a structural dimension, involving participation in the major institutions of a society, such as the labour 
market, education and health care system,  
 a cultural dimension or ‘acculturation’ which it described as the changes in immigrants’ cultural orientation 
and identification. 
The report identified four ‘domains’ of integration: socio-economic; cultural; legal and political; and the 
attitudes of the recipient society. It also identified possible indicators for each domain. In 2004 the EU member 
states adopted a set of Common Basic Principles (CBP) on migrants’ integration. These principles (see box 
below), while reiterating the general points in the Commission’s definition, did not themselves amount to a 
definition. They contained elements of earlier definitions together with policy measures deemed necessary to 
promote integration and an exhortation to establish goals based on indicators of integration. The last is the basis 
of the current INTI programme. The CBPs were not binding, a fact which was described as a major weakness in 
a subsequent report to the Commission (Niessen and Huddleston, 2007).

The common Basic Principles (CBP) 
1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of 
Member States 
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU. 
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the 
contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to make such contributions visible. 
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable to integration; 
enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration. 
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendents to be more 
successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to 
national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration. 
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for 
integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and 
stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member 
State citizens. 
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must 
be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights and with national law. 
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and 
measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration. 
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and 
public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation. 
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, to evaluate 
progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective. 
Source: Council of the European Union, 2004 
In parallel with the EU, member states developed their own policies and definitions. In 1996 the British Home 
Office commissioned a five-year research project on integration. The final report, Integration: Mapping the 
Field (Castles et al., 2001) concluded that: ‘There is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of 
immigrant and refugee integration. The concept continues to be controversial and debated’. It suggested, 
                                                          
3
 European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) based at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
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however, that a number of themes consistently recurred within the over 40 formal definitions reviewed and 
proposed a working definition: 
An individual or group is integrated within a society when they: achieve public outcomes within 
employment, housing, education, health, etc. which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider 
host communities, and are in active relationship with members of their ethnic or national community, 
wider host communities and relevant services and function of the state, in a manner consistent with 
shared notions of nationhood and citizenship in that society. 
On the basis of this definition, the Home Office developed a framework for integration for use in local planning 
and evaluation in the field of refugee integration (Home Office, 2004b. This consists of ten domains, grouped 
into four themes (Figure 1). Potential indicators were identified within each domain but the report 
acknowledged that ‘it is unlikely that all indicators listed will be relevant or feasible as measures’.  
Figure 2 – The Home Office’s “Indicators of Integration Framework” 

Source: Home Office, 2004  

Unsurprisingly, the debate among policy makers has not produced a single, commonly accepted definition of 
integration. Those outlined above prioritise different dimensions although they also contain some common 
elements. Integration is seen as implying minimal levels of material well-being and as dependent on the ability 
to exercise rights. It is also described as a complex, multi-level process, including tangible and intangible 
elements. The former are potentially measurable subject to the availability of adequate data while for the latter 
measurement remains difficult if not impossible. Integration is acknowledged to be a two-way process rather 
than a one-way route in which migrants are expected to conform to the norms of the ‘host’ culture. Integration is 
also to be based on a clear set of rights within the host nation. This vision appears, however, to contrast with 
actual policy developments at European and national level.  
One particularly contentious area has been the notion of ‘shared values’ which is contained in the CBP and is 
increasingly evident in current notions of ‘Britishness’. These values are generally taken to mean commitment 
to principles such as freedom, democracy and human rights.  In invoking these universal values, they lay claim 
to them as uniquely British (or European). In a speech in 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that Britain’s 
‘essential values’ were ‘belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this 
country and its shared heritage’ … ‘is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves 
British’.
4
At the same time, however, migrants are required to respect the specific histories and values of 
European states. This contradiction is encapsulated in the oath which new British citizens are required to swear, 
which demands allegiance to both ‘democratic values’ and to the hereditary monarchy. Migrants, as well as 
                                                          
4
 8/12/2006 speech by Tony Blair “The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values” (see www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page10563.asp) 
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many nationals, may reject a notion of ‘Britishness’ or ‘Europeanness’ which does not acknowledge inequalities 
while at the same claiming unique ownership of progressive values.  
More broadly, the relationship between rights and obligations has been increasingly contentious. The British 
definition above emphasises rights as a foundation for other elements of integration, with knowledge of the 
language seen as a ‘facilitator’. Increasingly policies are proceeding in a contrary direction, with the rights of 
citizenship granted only on the basis of knowledge of the language. 
The working definition of integration adopted by the partners in the MITI project included many aspects of the 
official definitions, including its multi-faceted nature, encompassing both material conditions and broader 
aspects of belonging to a society. At its base is the notion of rights, which are seen as the basis for integration 
rather than being conditional on fulfilling obligations. Moreover, the notion of values involves mutual 
obligations. Clearly only limited aspects of this are measurable through official statistics, primarily those 
concerned with ‘material resources’. The issue of rights, has been discussed above in relation to policy and was 
the area on which MIPEX focused. 
MITI Project Working Definition of Integration 
Integration is the condition (or process) of feeling a full and active member of the society in which 
one lives, having the means and opportunities to participate, as far as one chooses, in the wider 
society within the context of  adherence by both migrants and the ‘host’ society to universal human 
rights. It encompasses:
 Rights –  both formal access to social, civil and political rights; and substantive access to 
rights (e.g. non-discrimination, freedom from harassment) 
 Ability to act independently - knowledge of language/structures of society (e.g. how to 
access services) 
 Material resources to participate in all aspects of life within the community (e.g.  adequate 
housing; employment appropriate to skills/qualifications; access to education and health)  
 Extensive local networks – social/emotional and instrumental  
 Sense of belonging/being at home/trust – ability to choose to maintain adapt and reject 
aspects of cultural traditions from country of origin/host country; presence of 
national/ethnic group ‘taken for granted’ – visibility within the mainstream 
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The measurement of integration and the setting of goals and targets was a key element of the Common Basic 
Principles. Measurement of integration, however, like other complex social processes, raises serious practical 
and conceptual problems. It can reduce these processes to specific outcomes in order to provide targets which 
can be monitored. In immigration policy, preoccupation with targets has led to a concentration on areas where 
measurable targets can be found, such as the ‘removal’ of asylum seekers (Somerville, 2006). As the definition 
discussed above suggest, integration contains elements which are hard to measure using existing data. 
Measurement needs to be based on a clear definition of the concept to be measured and the characteristics 
associated with this concept and only then can appropriate indicators be identified (Levitas, 2006). In spite of 
the complex understandings of integration contained in official and other definitions, in attempting to measure 
the phenomenon there may be a tendency to reverse this process, using those statistics which are available and 
which will have been generated for other purposes. Preoccupation with me	
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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 These may not reflect the concept adequately and contain serious ambiguities in relation to integration. In 
addition, in relation to British statistics, the available data on key indicators often relate to ethnicity rather than 
country of birth and are therefore of limited value in relation to immigration. 
  
The ‘measurement’ of integration may imply that it is a teleological process, whose end point is inclusion or 
integration into an existing society, an  assumption embedded in measures comparing average levels of social 
and economic welfare (by existing measures) with that of migrants. According to Niessen and Schibel (2004) 
‘indicators should have a clear and explicit normative interpretation: users should know which direction of 
change represents progress’. As Schoorl (2005: 21) suggests, however, judgement on what constitutes success 
or failure in socio-cultural integration ‘should not be passed too easily, as the elimination of differences in this 
domain is not necessarily the societal or political goal’. Moreover if integration is a two way process, the end 
product will be different from the starting point rather than the attainment of a common level. The process may 
also be non-linear, with movement both towards and away from integration, as the political and social context 
changes. The complexity of integration also means that progress in one dimension may not necessarily imply 
progress in another dimension and that ‘one type of integration can occur without the other’ (Schoorl, 2005: 21).  
Finally, the search for ‘measurable’ aspects of integration ignores the intangible elements which may be just as 
important and which are fundamental to the ‘holistic approach’ supported by the European Commission.
5
 The 
ERCOMER report, for example, argues that focusing on specific aspects such as the labour market where 
comparative data for member states is available is methodologically justifiable, though they admit that this 
implies benchmarking is possible “only in a modest way” (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003:.45). Immigrants have 
rarely had a voice in the debate on integration but where they have offered a view, they have tended to 
emphasise the intangible aspects (see for example Refugee Women’s Association, 2004). The imperative of 
measurement tends to promote a narrow notion of integration which runs counter to the acknowledgement of the 
complexity of the phenomenon and the range of dimensions, material, social and psychic, which it involves.  
These issues are intensified in indices which bring together a range of available data in order to gain a broader 
view of integration. The difficulties in constructing indices have been widely debated in relation to other 
complex processes, such as poverty and social exclusion (see for example Pantazis  et. al., 2006). These require 
the various factors to be appropriately weighted and their relevance to the process tested both theoretically and 
through statistical techniques. If the limitations of the data and the partial nature of such indices are not fully 
acknowledged, the results can be misinterpreted and be potentially dangerous if used to develop policy. Our 
research has suggested the need to be very cautious about what can be achieved.  Indeed, following the launch 
of the interim reports in Rome, the leading Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported on the index which our 
Italian partners had constructed as if it represented an unproblematic notion of ‘integration’.
6
 No mention was 
                                                          
5
 The European Commission communication (COM(2003) 336final) recommended that policy makers take into account 
“not only the economic and social aspects of integration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, 
citizenship, participation and political rights”. 
6
 La Repubblica, March 8 2008 
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made of the fact that they had stated that it represented only certain aspects of ‘integration’, nor of the 
limitations of the data on which it was based. 
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It was crucial to agree on the relevant group of ‘immigrants’ whose integration was to be measured. The 
definition of a migrant is complex, depending on national policies as well as histories of migration which 
determine which groups are perceived as migrants and ‘outsiders’. In some European states, for example, 
children of migrants may be described officially as migrants even when they are born in that state.  
One key distinction is whether migrants are defined as those born in another state or as having a nationality 
other than that of the state in which they reside. While there is much overlap between these two groups, they are 
distinct (see Table 10, page 38). The first definition may include nationals who have repatriated (a major issue 
in relation to Portugal where Portuguese nationals born in former colonies are not defined or perceived as 
‘immigrants’).  The second definition excludes migrants who have taken out citizenship in their country of 
immigration. This is a relatively small group in many European countries though more significant in the UK and 
in France. In view of the focus of the INTI programme on non-EU nationals, it was decided to base our 
definition on nationality rather than country of birth and to restrict it (where the data were available) to non-EU 
nationals. We recognised, however, that this choice imposes limitations which are particularly significant for the 
UK. 
The term ‘non-EU national’ encompasses a diverse range of national groups, including the most privileged as 
well as disadvantaged migrants. This problem arises in quantitative data in general since it attempts to add up 
using a common measure what may be very distinct experiences. In relation to migration, for example, there is 
huge diversity within as well as between national groups.  The notion of the ‘average’ migrant experience may 
therefore be of limited value. The literature on migrants integration, show that there are different typologies of 
integration for different groups or sub-groups (see for example Spencer, 2006). In recognition of this problem, it 
was decided to add an additional element in the data collection, producing case studies of particular national 
groups. In the British case the groups chosen were Australian, Bangladeshi, Chinese and Poles.  All were among 
the most significant groups in relation either to stock or flow of migrants and they represented a diverse range of 
migratory experiences, as the brief descriptions in the box below illustrates. We included one EU national group, 
Poles, which raised broader questions about the categories of EU and non-EU. 
Australians –  As part of the ‘Old Commonwealth’, the Australian population was until relatively 
recently predominantly composed of settlers from Europe, including Britain, and their descendants. Most 
Australian migrants to Britain are therefore white. Although the largest group migrating to Britain during 
the 1990s, the Australian population is only the tenth national group, reflecting temporary migration. 
Large numbers of young professionals enter through the Commonwealth Working Holiday Scheme, with 
time spent in Europe seen as a ‘rite of passage’ before settling down back home. It is, however, relatively 
easy to switch immigration status and prolong their stay. 
Bangladeshis – A ‘New Commonwealth’ groups, Bangladeshis  migrated to Britain in the post-war 
period to work in manufacturing industry and the restaurant trade. Recent migration has been 
predominantly family reunion but labour migration continuing. Many migrants originate from rural 
rather than urban backgrounds and are of low social status. A high proportion of those identifying as of 
Bangladeshi ethnicity are British nationals by birth or acquisition. They are one of the most 
disadvantaged ethnic groups in Britain in terms of socio economic status and educational attainment. 
Chinese – The Chinese population in Britain is highly diverse. Large scale migration took place from 
Hong Kong after World War Two. This group were British citizens and are concentrated in the 
restaurant trade and spatially dispersed. Recent migration has been predominantly from mainland China 
and includes professionals and business people as well as asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. 
People with Chinese ethnicity have the highest earnings and children have the highest level of 
achievement in education of any ethnic group in Britain. While seen as ‘model minority’, they are also 
subject to racism and stereotyping. 
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Poles – There are relatively small numbers remaining from the group which migrated from Poland 
during and after the Second World War and they are highly integrated in Britain. Large scale migration 
began in the 1980s, but new migrants have little connection with established communities. Migration has 
accelerated since EU accession 2004 and become more diverse with Poles starting to enter professional 
occupations as well as unskilled work in Britain. Though expected to be temporary migrants, many are 
now remaining long term.  
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A second issue was whether to attempt to measure the absolute level of migrant experience in relation to 
specific indicators or to compare this with that of nationals. The advantage of the latter is that it places migrants’ 
situation in relation to the local context in which they are resident. The absolute figures without reference to 
local conditions would tell us little about integration in that particular society. On the other hand, as we suggest 
above, the measurement of the gap between migrants and nationals (in most cases a negative one in the sense 
that migrants do worse on these measures) suggests that integration involves progress towards some desirable 
‘norm’ which has been reached by nationals. In spite of this problem, it was decided to choose the former 
method as telling us more about the process of integration.  
The Regional Dimension 
The project was based on comparing the situation in different regions within a state. It took as the relevant 
regions those designated by the EU in relation to its regional policy. The regional dimension, however, has very 
different meanings in different partner countries in relation both to policy making institutions and to sense of 
identification. In Italy, for example, regional elected officials are a major layer within the political system, while 
regional identification is important in relation to belonging and identify.  In the UK, however, apart from Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland and in some ways London, these regions have little relevance to policy making or 
to individuals’ sense of belonging and identity (see page 8). 
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In seeking to identify indicators of integration, we took as our starting point the three main areas used in the 
CNEL reports for Italy. These were: overview of the non-EU population, social conditions and the labour 
market. These could provide some indication of the extent to which migrants had achieved a basis for social and 
economic inclusion. In identifying indicators, two issues were important: 
 A clear relationship to integration  
 The availability of data: this had to be available on the basis of nationality and broken down by region.  
The following indicators were identified: 
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All partners were able to collect these data broken down by region, except in relation to one indicator for France. 
These data provide useful background information about the extent of migrant settlement and thus may suggest 
which regions have attracted migrants. They do not tell us anything directly about integration though they are 
useful when looked at in relation to other indicators. 
Common MITI Indicators on Migrant Population 
1.1 - Non EU population: regional proportion of the national total
1.2 - Non EU population: proportion in each region
1.3 - Non EU population change - 1996-2006
1.4 - Non EU population who have been in the UK for 5 years or more
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The range of available data on this aspect varied for each partner but in no case was it possible to provide a 
comprehensive overview of what partners considered to be the main issues relevant to integration. For Britain, 
the main areas where some data was available are as follows: 
  
Housing: the quality and type of housing was judged to be a good indicator of social conditions. In Britain, the 
Census gives data on the occupancy rate of housing and therefore provides a measure of the level of 
overcrowding. This data, however, is available only by ethnicity rather than nationality, and therefore cannot 
give any direct measure of integration. 
Health: Health is a crucial dimension of integration but the only measure based on nationality in Britain is the 
proportion with a disability. These included a general definition based on the Disability Discrimination Act 
(DDA) which includes those who have a long-term disability which substantially limits their day-to-day 
activities and a more narrow definition, work-limiting disability, which includes those who have a long-term 
disability which affects the kind or amount of work they might do. These are based on self-report and the 
likelihood of describing oneself as ‘disabled’ may vary by nationality due to cultural norms and taboos 
concerning illness. Health status itself is likely to be a poor indicator since the health of migrants, particularly 
recent migrants, is likely to be relatively good due to self-selection for migration and the age structure of the 
migrant population. This measure, therefore, while providing interesting information, can not be seen as a 
measure of integration.   
Certain indicators, (infant mortality, life expectancy and maternal death rate) are well-established as providing a 
good measure of overall socioeconomic well being. None of these measures are, however, available in Britain 
by country of birth. Furthermore, the relevant criterion for integration may be the ability to access health 
services (e.g. GP registration, take up of maternal health care services) an issue which is partially reflected in 
data on infant mortality and so on. 
Mixed marriage: The proportion of marriages which are ‘mixed’ in the sense that they involve partners of 
different nationality, may give an indication of integration in that they reflect social connections which spread 
wider than the national group. There are however problems of interpretation since a ‘mixed marriage’ may 
involve two people of different nationality but of the same national origin if one of the partners was either born 
in Britain or has acquired British nationality. Such a marriage may therefore not reflect integration into the 
wider society.  
British data is available for marriage based on ethnicity rather than nationality and thus does not relate to 
migrant integration a such. It nevertheless provides some interesting results and has been included in the tables 
below.  These data are not available broken down by region. 
Education: Access to education provides another dimension relevant to integration. Relevant indicators might 
include the proportion of children who stay on at school beyond the compulsory leaving age, or achievement in 
public examinations.  No comprehensive data broken down by nationality is available in Britain.   
In summary, there was no single indicator within this group which met the criterion of data availability and an 
unambiguous relation to integration. 
Common MITI Indicators on Socio-Economic Conditions
2.1 - Population in overcrowded accommodation (Difference between nationals and non-EU) 
2.2 - Health (Difference between nationals and non-EU) 
2.3 - Mixed Marriages 
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Data on the labour market were more similar between the partners since much comes from the Labour Force 
Survey which has been standardised across EU states.  
Unemployment: unemployment is a good indicator of disadvantage in relation to specific groups of nationals 
(e.g. in relation to ethnicity, age) but its relation to integration is ambiguous. It reflects migrant history (recent 
migrants are less likely to be unemployed) and the legislation (since certain groups do not have the right to 
claim unemployment benefits, or to remain in the country when unemployed).  
Sector of Activity: Information on the sectors in which migrants work provides an important  dimension to 
labour market integration and is especially useful when broken by nationality which allows us to identify labour 
market niches. The data, however, cannot be placed on a linear scale since sectors are not hierarchical. 
Occupational Status: The proportion of people in high status occupations relates to integration but in order for 
this to measure the extent to which people are able to find work at an appropriate level it needs to be analysed in 
relation to educational level. We therefore cross-tabulated the data on high status occupations (management and 
professional) with that on high educational level (a university degree). This gave an indicator of deskilling. 
Activity rate: The relationship of the activity rate (the proportion of the population of working age in the labour 
force, i.e. in employment or seeking work) to integration is complex. Low activity rates may reflect high 
proportions in education at the lower end of the age spectrum (and thus relative advantage) while at the upper 
end it may result from sickness or injury (and thus relative disadvantage) but also the ability to retire early (thus 
relative advantage). Migrants are likely to have high activity rates, especially recent migrants who may have 
migrated primarily for employment. 
We introduced this indicator in order to have an indicator of women’s involvement in the public sphere. Among 
women, however, there are more complex considerations concerning life course and family situation as well as 
cultural norms concerning women’s access to employment which may come into conflict with the need for 
women to take up employment in order to relieve family poverty due to male marginalisation in the labour force 
(Sales and Gregory, 1998). 
Income: Income levels, particularly when analysed in relation to occupation, provide a good indicator of 
favourable labour market integration. While there was some data on migrants’ income in the Labour Force 
Survey the response rate to this question was so low (less than 1% for non-UK residents) that the data was not 
meaningful and thus could not be included. 
In summary, the index of deskilling (occupational status cross tabulated with educational level) was the only 
indicator in this section for which the data was available and whose relationship to integration was clear.  We 
have thus also analysed this by gender and national groups. 
Common MITI Indicators on Labour Market 
3.1 - Unemployment rates (Difference between nationals and non-EU)
3.2 - Distribution by sector of activity 
3.3 - People in high occupational status (difference between nationals and Non EU) 
3.4 - People with high qualification (difference between nationals and Non EU) 
3.5 - Activity Rates (difference between Non EU and UK) 
3.6 - Average income (difference between Non EU and UK) 
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In order to assist the comparison of the results for each indicator across regions, the data was transferred into a 
common framework using a 100 point scoring system with a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 100, distributing 
scores for intermediate absolute values in proportion to their deviation from the mean.  

It should be emphasised that these scales refer only to the national context. The maximum value of an indicator 
was based on the top national score rather than an absolute value based on any notion of ‘ideal’ value or best 
practice. They cannot therefore be used directly to make an international comparison. 


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This section includes the tables based on the statistics discussed above. We have grouped them into the three 
areas and we comment on each indicator. The tables are numbered sequentially and those which are based on 
the MITI indicators are identified as such.   
We have also added tables for the selected national groups but these are not broken down by region since the 
sample size in the Labour Force Survey was too small to produce reliable results.  Where this was attempted 
many values were given as 100 % or 0%. 
8	1		

The UK Census is still the most widely used statistical source in research and policy reports on migration. The 
main strength of the Census is that it is a ‘universal’ survey, collecting data at every geographical level (from 
the national to the smallest local). It is also relatively easy to access and widely recognised in the mainstream as 
a ‘reliable’ source. On the other hand, the Census is limited by its low frequency (only every ten years) and, in 
relation to foreign population, by the fact that nationality is not included as a variable.
7
 Although information on 
country of birth is also collected, ethnicity is still the key dimension in most publicly available datasets and is 
used in a large number of studies on minority groups. The traditional 16 ethnic categories, mainly based on 
colonial and post-colonial immigration, appear inadequate to capture the super-diversity (Vertovec, 2006) of 
today’s Britain. 
8
Other statistical sources can be used to overcome some of the limitations of the Census and are employed - on 
their own or in conjunction with other data - to map the characteristics of migrants. In particular, the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), although initially developed as a source of information on the labour market, has become 
increasingly useful in providing insights on the UK population as a whole. The LFS is a quarterly survey of 
households living at private addresses in the UK. Although not a ‘universal’ survey, unlike the Census, it is 
intended to be representative of the whole population. The population covered is all people resident in private 
households, all persons resident in National Health Service accommodation and young people living away from 
the parental home in a student hall of residence or similar institution during term time. The sample design 
currently consists of about 55,000 responding households in Great Britain, representing about 0.2% of the GB 
population. The sample size, however, is too small to allow a regional breakdown by national groups.  
The data used in this report are mainly based on the LFS 2006, and the yearly data has been calculated as the 
average of four consecutive quarters for this report (as recommended by the LFS users guidelines). Whenever 
possible, we have based our indicators on the LFS as the most recent source. Where variables (indicators) 
agreed within the MITI project are not available from the LFS, the Census 2001 has been used. In this case the  
statistics are based on ethnicity and/or country of birth. 
LFS data broken down by nationality have been used very little in previous research. Moreover, the standard 
groups of countries devised by the ONS do not include EU / non-EU countries as such. All the figures in this 
report have been computed from scratch - working on the raw archive of about 480,000 records – and can 
therefore be considered an original set of data. 
                                                          
7
 Cross tables showing an example - based on the LFS -  of the relations between Ethnicity, Nationality and Country of 
Birth are given on page 38. 
8
 A consultation on user needs for ethnicity, national identity, language and religion information from the 2011 Census in 
England and Wales took place between December 2006 and March 2007. The review considered issues such as: categories 
included and excluded; collecting national identity data separately from ethnic group data; allowing multiple responses in 
the ethnic group question. The responses to this consultation should inform further question development. 
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Population by Nationality 
The total non-EU population in the UK is over 2 million, with the non-EU proportion of the population varying 
between 1.0% in Northern Ireland and 12.5% in London. London has both the largest absolute number and 
proportion of migrants. Two fifths (40.4%) of the non-UK population are concentrated in London (and 43.1% of 
the non-EU population) reflecting the capital’s dominance in the UK economically, financially, politically and 
culturally. The South East region has the second highest figure, reflecting its nearness to London and its 
prosperity and thus buoyant labour market. 
Northern Ireland is a region of more recent migration. It has only 1.6% of the non-EU but 3.5% of the non-UK 
population, probably reflecting the high number of Irish citizens living in Northern Ireland.  
In relation to our national groups, Australians, Bangladeshis and Chinese nationals all represent 0.1% of the 
population, while the Poles are higher at 0.4%, reflecting the recent growth in the population. The relatively low 
figures for Bangladeshis and Chinese may reflect the fact that a large proportion of people of Bangladeshi and 
Chinese ethnicity are British citizens (including second, third and fourth generations born in the UK). Most 
Poles in the UK are relatively recent migrants while Australians tend to be temporary migrants. In relation to 
ethnic categories, both would be classified as ‘white’. 
There is a higher than average concentration of Australians and Bangladeshis in London while this is lower for 
Chinese and Poles. This may reflect differential labour market niches. Poles have become increasingly dispersed 
according to figures from the Workers Registration Scheme, although these figures apply only to ‘registered’ 
workers. 
Population Change 
The non-UK population has increased in all regions except Northern Ireland where it has declined significantly. 
This may reflect specific changes in the Irish political context.  In most UK regions the increase in the non-UK 
population exceeds (or counterbalances the fall) in the UK population 
London and  the South East have experienced the largest absolute increase, while the North East had the 
smallest. The largest percentage increase was in Wales, but it started with a low base while. London’s 
percentage increase was the smallest though the largest in absolute numbers. London and the South East 
together accounted for over half (57.4%) of the increase with 12.8% in the East. The latter may reflect the 
concentration of many new migrants in agricultural employment.  
In general the figures indicate the continuing dominance of London as a pole of attraction for new migrants, but 
also the increasing dispersion of these new migrants across UK regions. It should be noted that the figures are 
for non-UK rather than non-EU. The tables broken down by nationality suggest that different national groups 
have very different patterns of growth across the regions. 
Length of residence 
It was not possible to disaggregate by all nationalities in the available LFS 1996 dataset. More than half of all 
non-EU nationals have been resident for over 5 years and can thus be said to be long term (and possibly 
permanent) residents. Regional variations are relatively low, although the proportion in Wales is considerably 
lower than in England and Scotland. The proportion in Northern Ireland is less than half the UK average, 
reflecting relatively recent migration (the region has traditionally been an area of emigration). London’s 
proportion is slightly higher than the national average reflecting its role as both a first port of call for new 
migrants and a place of settlement. 
The national case studies show significant differences, with Australians and Chinese nationals having a slightly 
lower proportion resident for more than 5 years while for Bangladeshis this is much higher. The proportion for 
Poles is much lower reflecting recent migration, especially following EU accession. There are substantial 
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regional differences but the figures should be treated with caution due to the small sample size.  For Australians 
the proportion in London is low, probably reflecting temporary (professional) migration to the capital, 
especially through the Working Holiday Scheme. The 100% figure for Wales probably reflects the small sample 
size. For Poles on the other hand, the highest proportion of long-term residents is in London where migration 
during the 1980s and 1990s was concentrated. The Bangladeshi long-term resident population is relatively even 
spread reflecting the larger settled community while the figures for Chinese figures show substantial variations, 
with Scotland and Northern Ireland the highest. 

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These tables show the complexity of migration history in the UK and thus the limitations of basing indicators of 
integration on nationality alone. 
Nationality and country of birth 
There is of course a strong relationship between nationality and country of birth, but 4.6% of UK citizens were 
born outside UK, while 42.9% of those born outside the UK have British nationality. This suggests a relatively 
high rate of nationalisation in Britain. This means that over two fifths of people who have migrated to Britain 
are not included in the figures for foreign nationals.   
Nationality and ethnicity 
Nearly 90% of the UK population defines themselves as white British, with 11% defining themselves as 
belonging to other ethnic groups. The non-EU population includes a higher proportion of non whites (over 70%) 
but includes 4.4% who define themselves as ‘white British’. 
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Table 4a - UK Population by Nationality (thousands) 
  Total UK Non UK Non EU EU Australia Bangla. China Poland 
North East 2,451.9 2,391.5 60.4 45.7 14.7 0.7 2.2 3.8 2.3 
North West 6,623.5 6,398.1 225.5 138.2 87.3 3.8 6.2 7.8 20.4 
Yorkshire and Hum. 4,921.9 4,727.2 194.7 113.9 80.9 2.2 3.3 5.3 21.5 
East Midlands 4,203.9 4,027.3 176.6 87.1 89.6 2.4 0.3 3.8 27.2 
West Midlands 5,232.0 4,984.1 247.9 171.5 76.4 2.6 6.6 3.2 15.7 
Eastern 5,458.9 5,177.8 281.1 165.9 115.2 6.4 4.1 5.0 21.4 
London 7,352.3 5,957.7 1,394.5 919.3 475.2 43.1 39.6 22.2 75.5 
South East 8,088.8 7,636.6 452.2 272.7 179.5 14.1 6.5 10.2 24.5 
South West 4,954.7 4,803.5 151.2 86.9 64.3 2.5 1.0 5.5 12.9 
Wales 2,898.8 2,829.7 69.0 38.6 30.5 2.1 2.7 1.2 3.6 
Scotland 4,955.8 4,819.8 136.0 74.5 61.5 5.6 0.5 1.8 13.0 
Northern Ireland 1,698.2 1,638.8 59.4 17.6 41.8 1.1 0.3 0.9 4.6 
UNITED KINGDOM 58,840.8 55,392.2 3,448.6 2,131.8 1,316.8 86.6 73.3 70.7 242.6 
Table 4b - UK Population by Nationality (% by nationality) 
  Total UK Non UK Non EU EU Australia Bangla. China Poland 
North East 100.0 97.5 2.5 1.9 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
North West 100.0 96.6 3.4 2.1 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Yorkshire and Hum. 100.0 96.0 4.0 2.3 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 
East Midlands 100.0 95.8 4.2 2.1 2.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 
West Midlands 100.0 95.3 4.7 3.3 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Eastern 100.0 94.9 5.1 3.0 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
London 100.0 81.0 19.0 12.5 6.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 1.0 
South East 100.0 94.4 5.6 3.4 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
South West 100.0 96.9 3.1 1.8 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Wales 100.0 97.6 2.4 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Scotland 100.0 97.3 2.7 1.5 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Northern Ireland 100.0 96.5 3.5 1.0 2.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
UNITED KINGDOM 100.0 94.1 5.9 3.6 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Source: MITI project elaboration on LFS 2006 
34
Figure 3 - Percentage of non-EU population in UK Regions 
Source: LFS 2006 
Map boundaries: Crown Copyright
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Table 5 - (MITI 1.1) Non EU population: regional proportion of the national total 
Non EU  Rank Region 
Number % MITI 1.1 
1 London 919,330 43.1 100 
2 South East 272,745 12.8 29 
3 West Midlands 171,458 8.0 18 
4 Eastern 165,853 7.8 17 
5 North West 138,192 6.5 14 
6 Yorkshire and Hum. 113,873 5.3 12 
7 East Midlands 87,083 4.1 9 
8 South West 86,854 4.1 9 
9 Scotland 74,475 3.5 7 
10 North East 45,743 2.1 4 
11 Wales 38,553 1.8 3 
12 Northern Ireland 17,628 0.8 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 2,131,785 100.0 - 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Table 6 - (MITI 1.2) Non EU population: proportion in each region 
Non EU 
Rank Region 
Total 
population Number % MITI 1.2 
1 London 7,352,291 919,330 12.5 100 
2 South East 8,088,836 272,745 3.4 21 
3 West Midlands 5,231,985 171,458 3.3 20 
4 Eastern 5,458,931 165,853 3.0 18 
5 Yorkshire and Hum. 4,921,933 113,873 2.3 12 
6 North West 6,623,545 138,192 2.1 10 
7 East Midlands 4,203,945 87,083 2.1 10 
8 North East 2,451,891 45,743 1.9 8 
9 South West 4,954,659 86,854 1.8 7 
10 Scotland 4,955,783 74,475 1.5 5 
11 Wales 2,898,768 38,553 1.3 4 
12 Northern Ireland 1,698,235 17,628 1.0 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 58,840,799 2,131,785 3.6   
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 7 - (MITI 1.3) Non UK population change - 1996-2006 (thousands)  
Change 2006-1996 
Rank Region 
Non-UK 
1996 
Non-UK 
2006 Number % MITI 1.3 
1 Wales 31.3 78.6 47.3 151.3 100 
2 East Midlands 75.5 186.7 111.2 147.4 98 
3 North East 24.7 58.8 34.0 137.7 94 
4 Yorkshire & Hum. 94.8 216.5 121.7 128.4 90 
5 Eastern 136.3 301.8 165.4 121.3 87 
6 South West 73.7 161.8 88.1 119.7 87 
7 Scotland 67.5 144.7 77.2 114.3 84 
8 South East 226.4 484.7 258.4 114.1 84 
9 North West 124.6 252.6 128.0 102.7 80 
10 West Midlands 145.5 260.0 114.4 78.6 69 
11 London 906.5 1,392.4 485.9 53.6 59 
12 Northern Ireland 397.5 61.4 -336.2 -84.6 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 2,304.4 3,600.0 1,295.6 56.2   
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS data (quarterly surveys: Nov. 1996 - Dec. 2006) 
Figure 4 - Components of Population change 1996 - 2006 
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Table 8 - (MITI 1.4) Non EU foreign born people who have been in the UK for at least 5 years 
Non EU  
resident for at least 5 years Rank Region 
All  
Non EU* 
Number % MITI 1.4 
1 London 862.7 509.4 59.1 100 
2 West Midlands 157.3 84.9 54.0 87 
3 East Midlands 82.7 42.9 51.9 81 
4 South East 258.1 131.0 50.8 78 
5 Eastern 155.1 77.9 50.2 76 
6 Scotland 71.0 35.0 49.2 74 
7 North West 126.7 61.2 48.3 71 
8 South West 82.6 39.7 48.1 71 
9 Yorkshire and Hum. 109.0 47.9 43.9 60 
10 North East 43.4 18.8 43.2 58 
11 Wales 33.0 12.6 38.2 45 
12 Northern Ireland 16.1 3.5 21.8 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 1,997.8 1,064.9 53.3   
Note: Only Non EU nationals who answered the question about year of arrival are included.  
This question was asked to foreign born people only. (*) Figures are in thousands. 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Table 9 - Foreign born people who have been in the UK for at least 5 years (percentages);  
Selected nationalities  
Region Non EU Australians Bangladeshi Chinese Poles 
North East 43.2 49.0 76.7 61.9 19.5 
North West 48.3 51.4 85.0 40.6 15.9 
Yorkshire&Hum. 43.9 80.2 67.1 39.7 3.5 
East Midlands 51.9 65.4 50.0 13.6 6.1 
West Midlands 54.0 39.4 97.8 55.8 4.2 
Eastern 50.2 64.1 82.6 59.5 10.5 
London 59.1 39.7 69.7 52.0 32.2 
South East 50.8 56.7 75.4 51.6 15.9 
South West 48.1 42.5 59.6 31.6 17.7 
Wales 38.2 100.0 42.3 17.2 12.1 
Scotland 49.2 64.7 64.9 68.3 5.8 
Northern Ireland 21.8 40.1 76.8 63.1 0.0 
UNITED KINGDOM 53.3 49.6 73.5 47.2 16.8 
Note: Only Non EU nationals who answered the question about year of arrival are included.  
This question was asked to foreign born people only.  
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 10a - 2006 – Population by Nationality and Country of Birth (thousands)   
  Nationality 
Country of Birth UK Non UK EU Non EU Total 
UK 52,866.7 169.4 57.9 111.5 53,036.1 
Outside UK 2,521.7 3,277.7 1,258.6 2,019.1 5,799.4 
Total 55,388.3 3,447.1 1,316.5 2,130.6 58,835.4 
Table 10b - 2006 – Population by Nationality and Country of Birth (% by Nationality) 
  Nationality 
Country of Birth UK Non UK EU Non EU Total 
UK 95.4 4.9 4.4 5.2 90.1 
Outside UK 4.6 95.1 95.6 94.8 9.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 10c - 2006 – Population by Nationality and Country of Birth (% by Country of Birth) 
  Nationality 
Country of Birth UK Non UK EU Non EU Total 
UK 99.7 0.3 0.1 0.2 100.0 
Outside UK 43.5 56.5 21.7 34.8 100.0 
Australia 32.6 67.4 1.9 65.4 100.0 
Bangladesh 64.6 35.4 0.4 35.0 100.0 
China 17.1 82.9 3.1 79.7 100.0 
Poland 9.9 90.1 90.0 0.1 100.0 
Table 11a - 2006 – Population by Nationality and Ethnicity (% by Nationality) 
Nationality 
Ethnicity UK Non UK EU Non EU Total 
White British 89.6 7.6 13.0 4.4 84.8 
Other White 2.9 42.7 73.6 24.2 5.2 
Indian 1.6 8.0 0.7 12.5 2.0 
Pakistani 1.3 3.2 0.6 4.7 1.4 
Bangladeshi 0.5 1.7 0.0 2.6 0.5 
Black Caribbean 1.0 2.1 0.4 3.2 1.1 
Black African 0.7 9.0 1.9 13.2 1.2 
Chinese 0.2 2.9 0.4 4.3 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 11b - 2006 – Population by Nationality and Ethnicity (% by Ethnicity) 
Nationality 
 Ethnicity UK Non UK EU Non EU Total 
White British 99.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 100.0 
Other White 51.6 48.4 31.3 17.1 100.0 
Indian 76.3 23.7 0.8 23.0 100.0 
Pakistani 86.8 13.2 1.0 12.3 100.0 
Bangladeshi 81.6 18.4 0.2 18.2 100.0 
Black Caribbean 88.2 11.8 0.7 11.0 100.0 
Black African 56.3 43.7 3.4 40.3 100.0 
Chinese 52.4 47.6 2.7 45.0 100.0 
Total 94.1 5.9 2.2 3.7 100.0 
Source: MITI project elaboration on LFS 2006
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Housing conditions (overcrowding) 
These figures are based on ethnicity rather than nationality and are therefore not directly related to the position 
of migrants relative to non-migrants. The ethnic categories are very broad and each contains a large range of 
national and ethnic groups. The ‘white’ category for example includes disadvantaged groups such as Turks and 
Poles as well as white Europeans. 
These figures relate only to England and Wales since there are separate censuses for Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. 
Overcrowding is highest in London for all groups (reflecting the high cost of housing as well as areas of 
deprivation). Asians, Black and ‘Chinese and other’ groups are substantially more likely to be overcrowded than 
whites. 
      
Health (Disability) 
Regional variations are greater for non-EU nationals than for UK nationals. No clear regional pattern emerges, 
although the region with the most recent immigration, Northern Ireland, has the lowest level of disability.  
In relation to our case study national groups, there are low rates of disability for Australians, Chinese, Poles; 
while the rate for Bangladeshi similar to UK. The low rate for Chinese may reflect taboos against revealing 
illness. Research by the authors on new Chinese migration to London revealed that discussing some kinds of 
illness, including cancer, is considered taboo (see Sales, R. et. al. forthcoming). The rate for most other non- 
white ethnic groups is close to that for white British. 
Mixed marriages 
The figures are by ethnic group rather than nationality and are not available broken down by region.  
White British are the most homogamous, reflecting the larger numbers of available partners within this group. 
The Irish have very low homogamy; mixed groups have low homogamy due to low numbers of potential 
partners. There are high rates of homogamy for Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi reflecting strong norms 
concerning suitable marriage partners; for black Caribbean the proportion is relatively low 
Gender differences are significant for Chinese with more females in mixed marriages and black Caribbean 
(more males). For other groups the rates are similar broken down by gender.
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Table 12 - People living in overcrowded accommodations, percentages by ethnicity 
  All people White Mixed Asian Black Others 
North East 6.9 6.5 13.7 25.0 17.1 24.2 
North West 7.3 6.2 13.9 30.2 18.9 23.8 
Yorkshire&Hum. 7.5 6.1 15.1 32.3 18.2 26.7 
East Midlands 5.8 4.9 11.3 21.5 16.4 21.8 
West Midlands 7.9 6.0 15.2 25.4 17.3 25.6 
East   6.1 5.4 12.2 27.2 19.5 20.9 
London 21.3 14.5 30.5 38.0 40.7 35.8 
South East 6.7 5.9 12.8 26.8 23.9 21.3 
South West 5.6 5.4 12.0 21.3 17.1 20.4 
Wales 5.8 5.5 11.7 21.6 18.9 21.8 
England & Wales 8.7 6.7 19.2 31.2 34.0 28.7 
Source: Census 2001 (Commissioned Table - M1019)        
    
Note: The occupancy rating provides a measure of under-occupancy and overcrowding.  
For example a value of -1 implies that there is one room too few and that there is overcrowding in the household. This 
assumes that every household, including one person households, requires a minimum of two common rooms (excluding 
bathrooms).
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Table 13a - (MITI 2.2a) Health – ‘Disability’ rates  
Difference between nationals and non-EU (regional to regional comparison) 
Rank Regions % of nationals 
with disability 
% of non-EU 
with disability 
Difference  
UK -  non EU* MITI 2.2a 
1 North East 32.0 12.4 19.6 100 
2 Scotland 27.7 9.7 18.0 86 
3 Northern Ireland 24.9 7.7 17.2 79 
4 South West 25.0 8.4 16.6 73 
5 North West  27.6 12.4 15.3 62 
6 East Midlands 26.6 11.9 14.7 57 
7 Eastern 23.2 9.0 14.3 52 
8 South East 23.4 10.1 13.3 44 
9 Yorkshire and Hum. 27.1 14.7 12.4 36 
10 Wales 30.0 18.4 11.6 29 
11 London 24.0 13.1 10.9 22 
12 West Midlands 25.4 16.9 8.5 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 25.9 12.4 13.5   
Table 13b - (MITI 2.2b) Health – ‘Disability’ rates  
Difference between nationals and non-EU (national to regional comparison) 
Rank Regions 
% of nationals 
with disability * 
% of non-EU 
with disability 
Difference  
UK - non-EU* 
MITI 2.2b 
1 Northern Ireland 25.9 7.7 18.3 100 
2 South West 25.9 8.4 17.6 93 
3 Eastern 25.9 9.0 17.0 88 
4 Scotland 25.9 9.7 16.2 81 
5 South East 25.9 10.1 15.9 78 
6 East Midlands 25.9 11.9 14.0 61 
7 North West 25.9 12.4 13.6 57 
8 North East 25.9 12.4 13.6 56 
9 London 25.9 13.1 12.8 49 
10 Yorkshire and Hum. 25.9 14.7 11.2 35 
11 West Midlands 25.9 16.9 9.0 15 
12 Wales 25.9 18.4 7.6 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 25.9 12.4 13.5   
Note: The table shows self reported ‘disability’ of any kind: either DDA or work-limiting. (See next table) 
(*) The figures for nationals refer to the UK average. 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 14 - Case Studies - People with disability*, by type of disability and nationality (percentages) 
DDA disabled and  
work-limiting disabled DDA disabled 
Work-limiting 
disabled only Not disabled Total 
UK 9.7 13.7 2.6 74.1 100.0 
EU 5.4 10.8 1.7 82.2 100.0 
Non EU 9.8 13.7 2.6 73.8 100.0 
Australia 2.3 2.4 1.0 94.3 100.0 
Bangladesh 10.6 9.5 4.4 75.4 100.0 
China 1.1 0.4 0.9 97.6 100.0 
Poland 2.0 3.2 0.8 94.0 100.0 
Portugal 8.7 3.8 0.8 86.7 100.0 
India 6.6 5.4 1.3 86.7 100.0 
Nigeria 1.3 1.8 0.3 96.6 100.0 
Somalia 9.7 9.0 2.4 78.9 100.0 
Ireland 9.7 23.2 2.3 64.9 100.0 
Note: DDA (Disability Discrimination Act) disabled includes those who have a long-term disability which substantially limits 
their day-to-day activities. Work-limiting disabled includes those who have a long-term disability which affects the kind or 
amount of work they might do. 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 15 - People married with somebody of a different ethnic group (percentages), by gender  
Female Male 
Ethnicity homogamous mixed homogamous mixed 
British 97.2 2.8 96.6 3.4 
Irish 36.9 63.1 38.7 61.3 
Indian 91.3 8.7 91.6 8.4 
Pakistani 93.1 6.9 91.7 8.3 
Bangladeshi 94.6 5.4 94.6 5.4 
Black Caribbean 74.6 25.4 67.5 32.5 
Black African 82.1 17.9 76.3 23.7 
Chinese 71.2 28.8 86.0 14.0 
Source: Census 2001 (Commissioned Table C0056)  
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Unemployment 
Overall non-EU nationals have a higher rate of unemployment than UK nationals. Only in Northern Ireland 
and the South East is the non-EU unemployment rate lower than that for UK nationals. In the case of 
Northern Ireland, this probably reflects the recency of migration there and thus the ambiguous relationship of 
this indicator to unemployment. The unemployment rate for UK nationals is also one of the lowest for any 
region. In the case of the South East this may reflect the more buoyant labour market, with the third lowest 
unemployment rate for UK nationals.  
In other regions, unemployment for non-EU nations is higher than for UK nationals but there are substantial 
regional differences in the gap between UK and non-EU with the highest in the North East and the West 
Midlands and the lowest in Wales . 
In relation to our national case studies, there is a low rate for Australians, the rate for Poles is around the 
national average while it is high for Bangladeshi and Chinese. These differences  reflect migratory histories 
as well as the status of these groups within the UK.  
Activity rates 
In general non-EU nationals have a higher activity rate than nationals. Only in four regions is this lower. The 
highest positive gap is in Northern Ireland, where migration is most recent. The variation in activity rates is 
higher for the non-EU population.  
In relation to gender, both male and female migrants have higher activity rates than UK nationals. For UK 
nationals, activity rates for males is higher than females for all regions, although there is little regional 
variation. For non-EU nationals, the gap between males and females is considerably more variable and in the 
case of the South West the female activity rate is larger than the male. The highest gender gap for non-EU 
nationals is the Eastern region, where female activity rate is above the UK rate and the non-EU average.  
Our national case studies revealed substantial differences in activity rates and in the relationship between 
male and female activity rates. For Australians the activity rate both males and females is high.  For 
Bangladeshi it is low for both with a very small female activity rate. The Chinese rate is very low for men 
with more women than men in employment. For Poles there is a high activity rate for both but a substantial 
gender gap. These differences suggest the complexity of the reasons for economic activity.
Sectors of activity 
Overall the sectoral distribution of UK and non-EU workers is not very different with exceptions in relation 
to Groups A-B and F. This reflects the broad categories included in each sector. Regional variations are 
greater for non EU nationals, reflecting patterns of migration in response to particular labour demand.  
The case studies reveal substantial national differences, with Australians concentrated in banking and finance 
and the public sector; Bangladeshis in hotels and restaurants and a low proportion in the higher status 
occupations; the Chinese are concentrated in restaurants and banking and the public sector, reflecting the 
diversity of recent migration streams; Poles  have a more even distribution across sectors again reflecting the 
growing diversity of migration. 
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Occupational status 
The proportion of non-EU nationals in high status occupations is slightly higher than for UK nationals, but 
there are strong regional variations. The highest gap is in Scotland and the lowest (a negative figure) in 
London. London has the highest proportion of UK nationals in high status occupations and has attracted high 
numbers of migrants into unskilled work.   
In relation to the case study groups, Australians are over-represented in high status occupations and under-
represented in low-status occupations; Bangladeshi are the opposite with under-representation in high status 
and over-representation in lower status occupations. The pattern for Chinese is  similar to UK nationalists 
while for Poles have the lowest occupational status of all groups, with a very low proportion in high status 
occupations and over half in low status occupations compared to a UK figure of only 18.4%. 
Qualification 
The proportion with high level qualifications (a degree or equivalent) is similar for UK and non-EU nationals 
overall, but there are large regional differences with the non-EU rate more than twice the UK rate in 
Northern Ireland and the non-EU rate only two third the UK rate in London, which has the highest UK rate.  
In relation to national case studies, Australians and Chinese are more highly qualified than the UK average, 
while Bangladeshis and Poles are lower.  
Deskilling 
The comparison of occupational status with education gives an indicator of deskilling. Overall the figures 
show some deskilling for non EU nationals relative to UK nationals although the differences are not 
substantial when taken for the UK as a whole. While there is limited regional difference for UK nationals, 
there is a significant regional dispersion for non-EU nationals. Wales has the least deskilling according to 
this measure (the only region where there is less deskilling for non-EU nationals than for UK nationals) 
while Northern Ireland, Yorkshire and Humberside and the North East do significantly worse on both 
measures.  
Breaking the figures down by nationality, however, shows a much more complex picture. The rate of 
deskilling for Australians is substantially lower than for UK nationals; it is relatively high for Bangladeshi 
and Chinese and very high for Poles. In the case of Poles this involves a fifth working in ‘elementary 
occupations. The figures broken down by gender shown significant national differences, which are not 
apparent in the overall figures for the category non-EU. These are striking in relation to Bangladeshis where 
there is higher deskilling for men but just above the UK average for women. This suggests that those women 
who are able to acquire a degree are likely to be able to find appropriate work while men find this much 
harder. For Poles, the opposite is the case with women more likely to face deskilling. Given the small sample 
size it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the data 
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Table 16a - (MITI 3.1a) Unemployment rates  
Difference between nationals and non-EU (regional to regional comparison) 
Rank Region UK  
unemployment rate 
Non EU  
unemployment rate 
Difference  
UK – non EU. MITI 3.1a 
1 Northern Ireland 4.3 3.1 1.3 100 
2 South East 4.5 4.0 0.5 95 
3 Wales 5.3 6.4 -1.1 83 
4 Yorkshire and Hum. 5.6 8.1 -2.4 73 
5 Scotland 5.2 7.7 -2.4 73 
6 East Midlands 5.2 7.8 -2.7 71 
7 South West 3.7 7.2 -3.5 65 
8 London 7.2 11.1 -3.9 62 
9 Eastern 4.6 10.2 -5.6 49 
10 North West  5.0 11.8 -6.8 41 
11 West Midlands 5.5 15.3 -9.8 18 
12 North East 6.2 18.4 -12.2 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 5.2 9.8 -4.6   
Table 16b - (MITI 3.1b) Unemployment rates  
Difference between nationals and non-EU (national to regional comparison) 
Rank Region UK  
unemployment rate 
Non EU  
unemployment rate 
Difference  
UK – non EU. 
MITI 3.1b 
1 Northern Ireland 5.2 3.1 2.1 100 
2 South East 5.2 4.0 1.2 94 
3 Wales 5.2 6.4 -1.2 79 
4 South West 5.2 7.2 -2.0 73 
5 Scotland 5.2 7.7 -2.5 70 
6 East Midlands 5.2 7.8 -2.6 69 
7 Yorkshire and Hum. 5.2 8.1 -2.9 68 
8 Eastern 5.2 10.2 -5.0 54 
9 London 5.2 11.1 -5.9 48 
10 North West 5.2 11.8 -6.6 44 
11 West Midlands 5.2 15.3 -10.1 21 
12 North East 5.2 18.4 -13.2 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 5.2 9.8 -4.6   
Table 16c - Unemployment rates, selected nationalities 
Occupational Status 
Nationality 
males females total 
UK  5.6% 4.7% 5.2% 
Non EU 9.2% 10.6% 9.8% 
Australians 3.8% 2.5% 3.1% 
Bangladeshi 11.4% 24.8% 14.5% 
Chinese 10.8% 13.5% 12.4% 
Polish 4.2% 7.6% 5.6% 
Note: Unemployment rate = ILO-defined unemployed population divided by active population
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006.
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Table 17a - (MITI 3.2) Distribution by sectors of activity (UK and Non EU workers) 
Distribution by sector of UK workers 
 Region A-B C-E D F G-H I J-K L-N O-Q X Total 
North East 0.7 1.4 13.6 8.7 18.8 6.9 11.7 31.7 6.4 0.0 100.0 
North West 1.1 0.7 14.0 7.7 20.1 7.2 14.2 29.9 5.2 0.0 100.0 
Yorkshire and Hum. 1.3 0.9 14.7 9.1 20.0 6.7 12.7 29.2 5.5 0.0 100.0 
East Midlands 1.6 1.0 16.6 8.1 20.1 7.1 12.6 27.4 5.6 0.0 100.0 
West Midlands 0.9 1.0 17.6 7.7 18.8 6.7 13.6 28.4 5.4 0.0 100.0 
Eastern 1.6 0.9 12.7 9.1 19.3 7.5 17.2 25.7 5.9 0.0 100.0 
London 0.3 0.3 7.3 5.7 15.3 7.2 25.3 29.5 9.2 0.0 100.0 
South East 1.4 0.9 11.6 8.1 18.5 7.1 19.0 26.7 6.7 0.0 100.0 
South West 2.0 1.1 12.3 9.1 20.6 5.4 14.3 28.9 6.2 0.1 100.0 
Wales 2.3 1.0 14.3 9.1 19.1 5.7 11.0 31.9 5.7 0.0 100.0 
Scotland 1.8 2.8 10.8 8.8 18.4 6.9 13.9 30.6 6.0 0.0 100.0 
Northern Ireland 3.7 0.9 13.3 9.7 20.5 4.3 9.4 34.0 4.1 0.0 100.0 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.4 1.0 12.9 8.2 19.0 6.8 15.6 28.9 6.2 0.0 100.0 
Distribution by sector of Non-EU workers 
 Region A-B C-E D F G-H I J-K L-N O-Q X Total 
North East 0.0 0.0 12.7 3.0 40.7 2.7 7.7 31.8 1.4 0.0 100.0 
North West 0.0 0.0 12.6 1.8 18.7 7.3 17.8 38.6 3.2 0.0 100.0 
Yorkshire and Hum. 0.0 0.5 15.5 3.1 21.5 6.6 16.8 32.8 3.3 0.0 100.0 
East Midlands 0.0 2.2 23.2 2.1 20.0 7.4 14.1 27.1 3.8 0.0 100.0 
West Midlands 1.0 0.2 20.7 1.9 18.2 11.2 9.5 33.8 3.4 0.0 100.0 
Eastern 0.2 0.4 10.7 3.0 19.4 4.6 18.5 31.9 11.0 0.3 100.0 
London 0.2 0.6 4.7 6.6 24.0 6.0 25.1 24.5 8.3 0.0 100.0 
South East 1.1 0.2 11.5 2.1 18.4 7.4 20.2 32.1 6.8 0.2 100.0 
South West 0.4 0.0 7.2 4.5 20.7 4.7 20.9 34.6 7.0 0.0 100.0 
Wales 0.0 0.0 8.8 2.6 16.6 3.7 12.1 49.6 6.6 0.0 100.0 
Scotland 3.0 6.1 4.0 3.4 25.0 8.2 9.6 35.6 3.9 1.3 100.0 
Northern Ireland 1.3 0.0 14.7 0.0 22.4 2.1 4.3 48.5 6.7 0.0 100.0 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.5 0.7 9.3 4.3 21.8 6.5 20.1 29.8 6.9 0.1 100.0 
Table 17b - Distribution by sector of workers of selected nationalities 
 Region A-B C-E D F G-H I J-K L-N O-Q X Total 
UK 1.4 1.0 12.9 8.2 19.0 6.8 15.6 28.9 6.2 0.0 100.0 
Australians 1.9 0.6 8.4 4.4 11.2 4.2 33.9 25.0 10.4 0.0 100.0 
Bangladeshi 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.0 50.9 10.9 5.4 17.4 4.8 0.0 100.0 
Chinese 0.0 0.8 9.6 1.0 40.7 4.9 16.0 27.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Polish 1.4 0.0 21.2 12.7 25.1 11.6 12.1 9.7 6.3 0.0 100.0 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Legend: A-B: Agriculture & fishing; C, E: Energy & water; D: Manufacturing; F: Construction 
G-H: Distribution, hotels & restaurants; I: Transport & communication 
J-K: Banking, finance & insurance etc; L-N: Public admin, educ & health 
O-Q: Other services; X: Workplace outside UK
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Table 18a - (MITI 3.3a) People in high occupational status  
difference between Non EU and UK (regional to regional comparison) 
% in high occupational status * 
Rank Region 
UK workers Non EU workers 
Difference 
Non EU - UK 
MITI 3.3a 
1 Scotland 39.0 62.1 23.2 100 
2 Wales 35.9 59.0 23.1 100 
3 Eastern 43.2 56.8 13.5 69 
4 Northern Ireland 35.0 41.3 6.3 46 
5 North West  39.8 45.1 5.3 43 
6 South West 42.5 45.9 3.4 37 
7 North East 36.6 37.9 1.3 30 
8 Yorkshire and Hum. 38.0 38.6 0.7 29 
9 South East 46.5 46.0 -0.5 25 
10 East Midlands 40.0 38.9 -1.1 23 
11 West Midlands 39.3 36.3 -3.0 17 
12 London 54.7 46.7 -8.0 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 42.2 46.5 4.3   
Note: (*) People working as managers, senior officials, professionals, associate professional and technical,  
i.e. Standard Occupation Classification ( SOC ) either 1, 2 or 3 (see next table). 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Table 18b - (MITI 3.3b) People in high occupational status  
difference between Non EU and UK (regional to national comparison) 
% in high occupational status * 
Rank Region 
UK workers Non EU workers 
Difference 
Non EU - UK 
MITI 3.3b 
1 Scotland 42.2 62.1 19.9 100 
2 Wales 42.2 59.0 16.8 88 
3 Eastern 42.2 56.8 14.6 79 
4 Northern Ireland 42.2 46.7 4.5 41 
5 North West  42.2 46.0 3.9 38 
6 South West 42.2 45.9 3.7 38 
7 North East 42.2 45.1 2.9 35 
8 Yorkshire and Hum. 42.2 41.3 -0.9 20 
9 South East 42.2 38.9 -3.3 11 
10 East Midlands 42.2 38.6 -3.5 10 
11 West Midlands 42.2 37.9 -4.3 7 
12 London 42.2 36.3 -5.9 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 42.2 46.5 4.3   
Note: (*) People working as managers, senior officials, professionals, associate professional and technical,  
i.e. Standard Occupation Classification ( SOC ) either 1, 2 or 3 (see next table). 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 19 - Distribution by occupational status, selected nationalities 
Occupational Status 
Nationality 
1-3 4-7 8-9 
UK  42.2 39.4 18.4 
Non EU 46.5 32.9 20.6 
Australians 69.7 25.0 5.4 
Bangladeshi 22.2 44.7 33.1 
Chinese 40.8 38.6 20.6 
Polish 13.7 29.9 56.5 
Source: LFS 2006 
Legend  
1:Managers and Senior Officials 
2:Professional occupations 
3:Associate Professional and Technical 
4:Administrative and Secretarial 
5:Skilled Trades Occupations 
6:Personal Service Occupations 
7:Sales and Customer Service Occupations 
8:Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 
9:Elementary Occupations  





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Table 20a - (MITI 3.4a) People with high qualification 
difference between Non EU and UK (regional to regional comparison) 
% highly qualified Rank Region 
UK 
workers 
Non EU 
workers 
Difference 
Non EU - UK 
MITI 3.4a 
1 Northern Ireland 15.5 34.8 19.4 100 
2 Scotland 17.9 24.9 6.9 60 
3 Wales 15.4 21.8 6.5 58 
4 North West  16.6 21.1 4.6 52 
5 North East 13.9 18.4 4.5 52 
6 Yorkshire and Hum. 15.1 18.4 3.3 48 
7 Eastern 17.4 20.1 2.7 46 
8 South West 18.7 20.6 1.9 43 
9 East Midlands 16.2 16.7 0.5 39 
10 West Midlands 15.8 14.5 -1.4 33 
11 South East 21.2 19.1 -2.1 30 
12 London 30.9 19.8 -11.1 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 18.8 19.6 0.8   
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Table 20b - (MITI 3.4b) People with high qualification 
difference between Non EU and UK (regional to national comparison) 
% highly qualified Rank Region 
UK 
workers 
Non EU 
workers 
Difference 
Non EU - UK 
MITI 3.4b 
1 Northern Ireland 18.8 34.8 16.1 100 
2 Scotland 18.8 24.9 6.1 52 
3 Wales 18.8 21.8 3.1 37 
4 North West 18.8 21.1 2.4 33 
5 South West 18.8 20.6 1.8 31 
6 Eastern 18.8 20.1 1.4 29 
7 London 18.8 19.8 1.1 27 
8 South East 18.8 19.1 0.4 24 
9 Yorkshire and Hum. 18.8 18.4 -0.3 20 
10 North East 18.8 18.4 -0.4 20 
11 East Midlands 18.8 16.7 -2.1 12 
12 West Midlands 18.8 14.5 -4.3 1 
  UNITED KINGDOM 18.8 19.6 0.8   
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 21 -  Distribution by qualification of selected nationalities * 
Highest Qualification 
 Nationality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 n.a. Total 
UK 18.8 8.6 24.3 23.9 10.3 13.5 0.7 100.0 
Non EU 19.6 5.8 9.8 6.4 40.8 16.7 0.9 100.0 
Australians 32.1 5.0 12.7 6.4 39.8 4.0 0.0 100.0 
Bangladeshi 12.0 2.3 1.5 8.9 25.1 46.9 3.2 100.0 
Chinese 30.1 4.7 6.1 2.5 44.0 11.8 0.8 100.0 
Polish 9.0 1.8 6.5 2.1 65.5 13.0 2.0 100.0 
Note: *  applies to people of working age 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Legend  
1: Degree or equivalent 
2: Higher education 
3: GCE A Level or equiv 
4: GCSE grades A-C or equiv 
5: Other qualifications 
6: No qualification 
7: Don't know 



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Table 22a (MITI 3.7a) - Workers with a degree working as managers or professionals (%) *
difference between Non EU and UK (regional to regional comparison) 
  UK Non EU Non EU - UK MITI 3.7a 
Wales 80.7 85.4 4.7 100 
East Midlands 84.1 81.7 -2.4 72 
Eastern 84.2 81.3 -2.9 71 
North West 82.6 78.1 -4.5 64 
London 85.0 79.6 -5.4 61 
South East 84.7 76.6 -8.1 50 
Scotland 83.4 72.2 -11.2 39 
West Midlands 85.3 73.2 -12.1 35 
South West 84.8 71.6 -13.1 31 
North East 82.2 62.8 -19.4 7 
Northern Ireland 79.4 59.7 -19.7 6 
Yorkshire and Hum. 83.4 62.5 -20.9 1 
UNITED KINGDOM 83.9 77.0 -6.9   
Table 22b (MITI 3.7b)- Workers with a degree working as managers or professionals  (%)*  
difference between Non EU and UK (regional to national comparison) 
  UK Non EU Non EU - UK MITI 3.7b 
Wales 83.9 85.4 1.5 100 
East Midlands 83.9 81.7 -2.2 86 
Eastern 83.9 81.3 -2.7 84 
London 83.9 78.1 -4.3 78 
North West 83.9 79.6 -5.8 72 
South East 83.9 76.6 -7.4 66 
West Midlands 83.9 72.2 -10.7 53 
Scotland 83.9 73.2 -11.7 49 
South West 83.9 71.6 -12.3 47 
North East 83.9 62.8 -21.2 13 
Yorkshire and Hum. 83.9 59.7 -21.5 11 
Northern Ireland 83.9 62.5 -24.2 1 
UNITED KINGDOM 83.9 77.0 -6.9   
Note: (*) Occupational status = 1, 2 or 3 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
53
Table 23 - Workers with a degree working by occupational status (all classes %), by nationality 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
UK 21.8 40.9 21.3 7.1 1.9 2.5 2.4 0.7 1.4 100.0
Non EU 18.6 40.5 17.9 7.2 1.5 5.6 4.1 1.2 3.4 100.0
Australia 27.2 57.9 9.9 2.2 0.0 1.7 0.5 0.0 0.7 100.0
Bangladesh 0.0 65.0 4.4 3.5 0.0 5.1 0.0 22.1 0.0 100.0
China 13.3 30.6 17.9 11.8 0.0 3.5 15.2 0.0 7.7 100.0
Poland 6.1 21.4 7.9 14.2 5.6 10.9 3.8 9.8 20.3 100.0
Legend: 
1:Managers and Senior Officials ; 2:Professional occupations ; 3:Associate Professional and Technical 
4:Administrative and Secretarial ; 5:Skilled Trades Occupations ; 6:Personal Service Occupations ; 7:Sales and 
Customer Service Occupations; 8:Process, Plant and Machine Operatives ; 9:Elementary Occupations  
Figure 5 – Workers with a degree by occupational status (aggregated classes)  
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Table 24 - Workers with a degree working as managers or professionals*, by nationality and gender 
 Males Females All 
UK 86.7% 80.7% 83.9 
Non EU 78.7% 74.8% 77.0 
Australia 96.6% 93.2% 95.0 
Bangladesh 59.8% 81.1% 69.4 
China 62.1% 61.7% 61.8 
Poland 40.0% 28.6% 35.4 
Note: (*) Occupational status = 1, 2 or 3 
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 25a - (MITI 3.5a) Activity Rates – difference between Non EU and UK  
(regional to regional comparison) 
Range Regions UK population 
activity rate 
Non - EU population 
activity rate 
Difference  
UK – Non-EU MITI 3.5a 
1 Northern Ireland 59.4 74.4 15.0 100 
2 Eastern 64.3 73.9 9.6 73 
3 South West 62.8 71.7 8.9 69 
4 South East 66.0 74.0 8.0 65 
5 Wales 59.2 66.2 7.0 60 
6 Scotland 63.0 67.8 4.8 49 
7 London 64.2 66.5 2.3 36 
8 North West  61.7 62.1 0.4 26 
9 Yorkshire and Hum. 62.3 61.7 -0.6 21 
10 North East 59.8 57.5 -2.3 13 
11 West Midlands 62.7 59.5 -3.2 8 
12 East Midlands 64.7 60.1 -4.7 1 
  Total 63.1 66.8 3.7   
Note: Activity rate = (Employed + ILO Unemployed) / Total Working Age Population
  
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
Table 25b - (MITI 3.5b) Activity Rates – difference between Non EU and UK  
(regional to national comparison) 
Range Regions UK population 
activity rate 
Non - EU population 
activity rate 
Difference  
UK – Non-EU MITI 3.5b 
1 Northern Ireland 63.1 74.4 11.3 100 
2 South East 63.1 74.0 10.9 98 
3 Eastern 63.1 73.9 10.8 97 
4 South West 63.1 71.7 8.6 84 
5 Scotland 63.1 67.8 4.7 62 
6 London 63.1 66.5 3.4 54 
7 Wales 63.1 66.2 3.1 52 
8 North West  63.1 62.1 -1.0 28 
9 Yorkshire and Hum. 63.1 61.7 -1.4 25 
10 East Midlands 63.1 60.1 -3.0 16 
11 West Midlands 63.1 59.5 -3.6 13 
12 North East 63.1 57.5 -5.6 1 
  Total 63.1 66.8 3.7   
Note: Activity rate = (Employed + ILO Unemployed) / Total Working Age Population
Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006. 
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Table 26 - Activity rates by Region  and Gender 
 UK Non EU 
Male Fem. M - F Male Fem. M - F 
North East 53.1 44.3 8.8 51.2 38.2 13.0 
North West 53.7 45.6 8.1 64.1 41.2 22.8 
Yorkshire and Hum. 55.5 45.1 10.4 60.4 41.0 19.5 
East Midlands 56.9 47.7 9.2 64.8 40.7 24.1 
West Midlands 55.4 44.9 10.5 60.3 36.7 23.6 
Eastern 56.9 46.5 10.4 75.8 49.3 26.6 
London 56.0 44.3 11.8 67.1 49.0 18.1 
South East 58.0 48.4 9.6 67.1 53.1 14.0 
South West 56.0 46.6 9.4 61.3 62.7 -1.4 
Wales 52.0 43.7 8.3 62.6 46.2 16.4 
Scotland 56.2 47.1 9.1 59.5 54.6 4.9 
Northern Ireland 51.8 40.9 10.9 69.5 47.5 22.0 
Total UK  55.6 45.9 9.7 65.6 47.9 17.7 
Source: LFS 2006 (annual average of four quarters) – all people population 16+ 
Table 27a - Economic activity by Selected Nationalities and Gender (thousands) 
Male Female All 
  Empl. unempl. inactive empl. unempl. inactive empl. unempl. inactive 
UK 14,189.1 841.8 6,404.0 12,413.5 613.1 10,008.0 26,602.5 1,454.9 16,412.0 
Australia 34.4 1.4 3.3 33.4 0.8 7.4 67.9 2.2 10.8 
Bangladesh 19.9 2.6 9.6 5.2 1.7 26.6 25.1 4.3 36.3 
China 12.7 1.5 14.3 17.0 2.7 17.1 29.7 4.2 31.4 
Poland 104.7 4.6 9.9 67.7 5.6 22.4 172.4 10.2 32.4 
Total 15,204.0 930.2 6,722.7 13,228.1 692.7 10,660.8 28,432.0 1,622.9 17,383.5 

Source: LFS 2006 (annual average of four quarters) – all people population 16+ 
Table 27b -  Economic activity by Selected Nationalities and Gender (%) 
Male Female All 
  empl. unempl. inactive empl. unempl. inactive empl. unempl. inactive 
UK 66.2 3.9 29.9 53.9 2.7 43.4 59.8 3.3 36.9 
Australia 88.0 3.5 8.5 80.2 2.0 17.8 84.0 2.7 13.3 
Bangladesh 62.0 8.0 30.0 15.4 5.1 79.5 38.2 6.5 55.3 
China 44.7 5.4 49.9 46.2 7.2 46.6 45.5 6.4 48.1 
Poland 87.8 3.8 8.3 70.7 5.9 23.4 80.2 4.7 15.1 
Total 66.5 4.1 29.4 53.8 2.8 43.4 59.9 3.4 36.6 

Source: MITI Project elaborations on LFS 2006  – all people 16+ 

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The data suggests that differences between national groups are more significant than those between EU and 
non-EU nationals as a whole. Most of the indicators discussed above cannot be linked to integration, or to 
social status, in any straightforward way. They suggest, however, very different migratory experiences for 
different groups. On the one indicator we were able to use which we suggest has a clear and unambiguous 
relation to integration, deskilling Poles, who are EU citizens do worse than the average for non-EU nationals, 
while Australians, who are non-EU nationals, do better than the UK population.  
These data in themselves tell us little about migratory strategies and the possibilities for future integration.  
Both Australians (and others from the ‘Old Commonwealth) and Poles for example use temporary migration 
as part of longer term strategies based on returning to their country of origin. The former, however, generally 
take up professional work within Britain, expanding both professional and personal experience (Conradson 
and Latham, 2005) the latter often take up low status work since the wage differential permits them to earn 
enough to secure a better life style in Poland (Morokvasic, 2004). These strategies may, of course, change as 
the data on longer term residence suggest.  
In the case of our other two groups, the Bangladeshis and the Chinese, the problem of defining ‘immigrant’ 
in terms of nationality are more acute. Both have large settled communities in Britain with high levels of 
citizenship acquisition. Thus many immigrants form these areas are excluded from the figures based on 
nationals. The data suggest, however, that Bangladeshis have relatively poor labour market status, 
particularly in relation to deskilling, while the experience of Chinese is more mixed. 
The regional differences are difficult to interpret especially since most of the indicators are ambiguous and it 
is not possible to break the figures down by individual national group. Only in relation to Northern Ireland 
and London are distinct patterns discernible. The results for Northern Ireland tend to be on the extreme end 
for most indicators, reflecting its recent history of migration.  The data on population suggests the continuing 
dominance of London in relation to both new migration and settlement but the more mixed picture in relation 
to the labour market and social conditions suggest the diversity of migrant experience in the capital.
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Table 28a - Indicators of migrant population 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
North East 4 8 94 58 
North West  14 10 80 71 
Yorkshire and Hum. 12 12 90 60 
East Midlands  9 10 98 81 
West Midlands  18 20 69 87 
Eastern 17 18 87 76 
London  100 100 59 100 
South East 29 21 84 78 
South West 9 7 87 71 
Wales  3 4 100 45 
Scotland  7 5 84 74 
Northern Ireland  1 1 1 1 
MITI 1.1 - Non EU population: regional proportion of the national total 
MITI 1.2 - Non EU population: proportion in each region 
MITI 1.3 - Non UK population change - 1996-2006 
MITI 1.4 - Non EU people who have been in the UK for at least 5 
years
Table 28b - Indicators of socio-economic conditions (Disability) 
2.2a 2.2b 
North East 100 56 
North West  62 57 
Yorkshire and Hum. 36 35 
East Midlands  57 61 
West Midlands  1 15 
Eastern 52 88 
London  22 49 
South East 44 78 
South West 73 93 
Wales  29 1 
Scotland  86 81 
Northern Ireland  79 100 
MITI 2.2a - Health (Disability rates) 
difference between UK and Non EU (regional to regional comparison) 
MITI 2.2b - Health (Disability rates) 
difference between UK and Non EU (national to regional comparison)
Table 28c - Indicators of labour market 
regional to regional comparison regional to UK national comparis. 
3.1a 3.3a 3.4a 3.5a 3.7a 3.1b 3.3b 3.4b 3.5b 3.7b 
North East 1 30 52 13 7 1 35 20 1 13 
North West  41 43 52 26 64 44 38 33 28 72 
Yorkshire and Hum. 73 29 48 21 1 68 20 20 25 11 
East Midlands  71 23 39 1 72 69 10 12 16 86 
West Midlands  18 17 33 8 35 21 7 1 13 53 
Eastern 49 69 46 73 71 54 79 29 97 84 
London  62 1 1 36 61 48 1 27 54 78 
South East 95 25 30 65 50 94 11 24 98 66 
South West 65 37 43 69 31 73 38 31 84 47 
Wales  83 100 58 60 100 79 88 37 52 100 
Scotland  73 100 60 49 39 70 100 52 62 49 
Northern Ireland  100 46 100 100 6 100 41 100 100 1
MITI 3.1 - Unemployment rates  - difference between UK and Non EU  
MITI 3.3 - People in high occupational status - difference between Non EU and UK  
MITI 3.4 - People with high qualification - difference between Non EU and UK  
MITI 3.5 - Activity Rates - difference between Non EU and UK    
MITI 3.7 - Workers with a degree working as managers or professionals - difference between Non EU and UK 
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The identification of indicators of integration and the search for relevant national data has produced a 
complex and original data set which provides some valuable information about the characteristics of migrant 
populations including their regional dispersal. It has also suggested gaps in data sources. It was not possible 
to collect data on all the indicators identified in the project while in some cases we relied on data on ethnicity 
rather than nationality. Many of these indicators were, in any case, ambiguous with for example what may be 
seen as positive results in relation to the labour market (e.g. low unemployment) being strongly related to 
recent migration as in the case of Northern Ireland. For reasons of both data availability and doubts about the 
reliability of available indicators therefore it was not possible to construct an index, even a partial one 
relating to socio economic conditions as proposed in the original MITI project.  
Our data show significant differences in the characteristics of the migrant population across regions, with 
more regional variation identified for migrants than non migrants on most indicators. No clear regional 
pattern emerges in the sense that regions score similarly across different indicators (see table 28 ).  The 
exceptions to this conclusion are the specific cases of London and Northern Ireland. The former has the 
longest standing, largest and most diverse migrant population, and thus also the largest minority ethnic 
population. It continues to be the major destination for new migrants, although different national groups have 
very different spatial patterns as for example the Polish example shows. London’s diversity is also illustrated 
by the data on social and labour market conditions. Northern Ireland, on the other hand, is a region of new 
migration and thus the results here tend to be concentrated at the other end of our percentage scale. In 
general, however, the regional dimension based on EU categories does not seem to be highly significant in 
relation to the data we have collected.  We acknowledge the importance of the local dimension to integration, 
but this does not appear to be the appropriate geographical level.  
The data also raised questions about the usefulness of the categories EU and non-EU nationals in relation to 
integration.  There is significantly more difference within these broad categories than between the two 
groups as a whole, as demonstrated by our national case studies. In particular, the Polish national group, 
although now EU citizens, do significantly worse on many indicators than non-EU nationals as a whole.  
This suggests that these categories are not appropriate in relation to overall measurements of integration, or 
to policy measures aimed at integration. 
Much of the data confirms what we would have expected both in relation to the regional dimension and in 
relation to the individual national groups which we examined. Some particularly striking results, which could 
benefit from further study, included: 
 Deskilling.  the indicator of deskilling which we constructed using occupational status and 
qualification which we suggest is a useful indicator of integration. It demonstrated a huge variety of 
national experience although the Labour Force Survey sample was not large enough to produce 
meaningful results at regional level.  The data suggests high levels of deskilling for some groups 
(particularly Poles) and indicates that specific targeted policy measures might be necessary to 
overcome this.  
 Disability. The available data based on different definitions of disability showed interesting 
differences in the way in which different national groups defined themselves in relation to health and 
illness. Differences in frequency of disability as a whole may reflect different migratory histories 
(particularly life course). The differences in the proportions identifying themselves as having a long
term disability, compared with the more narrow definition of ‘work limiting’ disability, suggest that 
other factors are relevant, including different attitudes to and beliefs about health.  
The process of attempting to define integration, to identify indicators and collect data reinforced our 
concerns about the measurement of integration and the need be absolutely clear about the limitations of the 
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data and what it can be taken to mean. The indicators we identified reflected only a partial aspect of what is a 
highly complex, and personal, process. Even these indicators which we were able to identify as potentially 
measurable often had a complex and ambiguous relation to integration. They cannot themselves be taken as 
measuring integration, although they may provide useful information on aspects of it. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the scores of these indicators on our scales and specific policy measures is unclear. 
High ‘scores’ in a region do not imply that they are the result of positive policies, or that those with the 
highest scores therefore represent ‘best practice’. Much more would need to be done to explore this relation 
before any such policy conclusions could be drawn. 

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In view of the above conclusions, we recommend the following measures to policy makers and those 
responsible for official data sources at an EU and national level: 
Data availability 
• Improvements in data availability to facilitate a better national understanding of aspects of the 
profile of migrant groups and to promote international comparability. In particular relevant data on 
socio economic conditions could be made available by national group, for example through a 
question on this in the Census. In additional, statistics on health (e.g. infant mortality) and education 
(e.g. participation in post-compulsory education) broken down by nationality would provide useful 
insights.  
• Discussion should take place at European level, as well as in individual states, about the relevant 
category in relation to integration (e.g. ethnicity or nationality). Data collection by ethnicity, which 
is being discussed in some European states. would provide valuable information about the process of 
integration and inequality.  
Public understanding of statistics 
Policy makers, researchers and the media need to: 
• Develop a better understanding of the uses and limitations of statistics, acknowledging the partial 
nature of many statistical measures and ‘indices’ of social processes, and the limitations of using 
these statistics in policy making. 
• Promote better public understanding of the uses and limitations of statistics through taking a more 
critical stance towards published statistics. 
The nature of integration 
• It is important to acknowledge the intangible aspects of integration in evaluating progress towards 
integration. This suggests the importance of involving migrants in discussions about the definition 
and measurement of integration as well as in policy making. 
• European projects on integration should include mixed method approaches which can explore these 
intangible elements of integration as well as the variety of migratory experience  
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The categories ‘EU’ and ‘non-EU’ citizen in relation to integration 
• The EU and other policy making bodies should acknowledge the limitations of these categories in 
relation to research, statistics and policy development in relation to integration.  
The local dimension 
• The EU-designated regions have limited relevance in relation to policy making in some states. 
Research and policy therefore needs to focus on more relevant geographical levels, including the city 
and local authorities. 

61
3	1	
  
Bloch, A. (1999) ‘Introduction’, to A. Bloch and C. Levy (eds) Refugees, citizenship and social policy in 
Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Bloch, A. and Schuster, L. (2005) ‘At the extremes of exclusion: Deportation, detention and dispersal’ Ethnic 
and Racial Studies Vol 28/3 pp. 491-512. 
Carey-Wood, J., Duke, K., Karn, V. and Marshall, T. (1995) The settlement of refugees in Britain, London: 
HMSO  
Castles, S. and Davidson, A. (2000) Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the politics of belonging
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Castles, S., Korac, M., Vasta, E., Vertovec, S. (2001), ‘Integration: Mapping the Field’, Home Office Online 
Report 29/03. 
Cohen, S, Humphries, B. and Mynott, E.  (eds) From immigration controls to welfare controls, London: 
Routledge. 
Cohen, R. (2006) Migration and its Enemies: Global Capital, migrant labour and the nation-state Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Commission of the European Communities (2003), Communication on immigration, integration and 
employment, COM (2203) 336 final 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), Our Interim Statement, 
www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk 
Conradson, D. and Latham, A. (2005) ‘Friendship, networks and transnationality in a world city: antipodean 
transmigrants in London’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol 31, no 2, pp 287–305. 
CNEL (2007), Quinto rapporto sugli indici di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia, Roma,  
CNEL, Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro 
CRONEM (2007) Polish Migrants Survey Results, For BBC Newsnight 
D’Angelo, A. (2006), ‘L’immigrazione nell’Unione Europea a 25’, in Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 
Caritas/Migrantes, IDOS, Roma 
Entzinger, H., Biezeveld, R. (2003), ‘Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration’, ERCOMER (European 
Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations) 
Favell, A. (2001), ‘Integration policy and integration research in Europe: a review and critique’, in 
Aleinikoff, T.A. and Klusmeyer, D. (eds), Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Favell, A. (2003), ‘Integration Nations: the Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe’, in 
Comparative Social Research, volume 22, 13-42, pp.13-42 
Flynn, D. (2005) ‘New borders, new management: the dilemmas of modern immigration policies’ Ethnic and 
Racial Studies Vol 28/3 pp 463-490. 
62
Geddes, A. (2000) Immigration and European Integration: Towards fortress Europe? Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Gillborn, D. (1995) Racism and Antiracism in Real Schools: theory,  policy, practice. Buckingham, Open 
University Press 
Hickman, M.J. and Walter, B. (1997) Discrimination and the Irish community in Britain, London: CRE. 
Holmes, C. (1988) John Bull’s island: immigration and British society, 1871–1971, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Home Office (2002) Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, White Paper, 
London: HMSO. 
Home Office (2004a) Life in the United Kingdom: a journey to citizenship, London: HMSO 
Home Office, (2004b), Indicators of Integration - final report, Home Office Development and Practice 
Report, No 28. 
Home Office (2006) A Points-based System: making Migration Work for Britain London: HMSO. 
JCWI (2006) Immigration, nationality and refugee law handbook London: JCWI.  
Jones, C. (1977) Immigration and social policy in Britain, London: Tavistock. 
Kofman, E., Lukes, S., D’Angelo, A., Montagna, N. (2008), The equality implications of being a migrant in 
Britain, EHRC (Equality and Human Rights Commission) 
Kofman, E. and Sales, R. (1998) ‘Migrant women and exclusion in Europe’, European Journal of Women’s 
Studies, vol 5, nos 3–4, pp. 381–98.  
Koser, K and Lutz, H. (1998) ‘The new migration in Europe: contexts, constructions and realities’, in K. 
Koser and H. Lutz (eds) The new migration in Europe: social constructions and social realities’, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Levitas, R. (2006) ‘The concept and measurement of social exclusion’ in Pantazis, C., Gordon, D and Levitas, R. 
(eds.) (2006) Poverty and social exclusion in Britain: the millennium survey Bristol: the Policy Press. 
MIPEX, 2007 Migrant Integration Policy Index (edited by J. Niessen, T. Huddleston, L. Citron), British
Council and Migration Policy Group - www.integrationindex.eu 
Morokvasic, M. (2004) ‘Settled in mobility: engendering post-wall migration in Europe’, Feminist Review, 
vol 77, pp 7–25. 
Neissen, J. (2005) Migration governance and the Lisbon Agenda, European Policy Centre.  www.epc.eu 
Niessen, J., Huddleston, T. (2007), Setting up a system of benchmarking to measure the success of 
integration policies in Europe, MPG Report, Brussels, European Parliament 
Niessen, J. and Schibel, Y. (2004), ‘Handbook on integration for policy-makers and practitioners’, European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security. 
Pantazis, C., Gordon, D and Levitas, R. (eds.) (2006) Poverty and social exclusion in Britain: the millennium 
survey Bristol: the Policy Press 
Paul, K. (1997) Whitewashing British: Race and citizenship in the Postwar era, Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press. 
Refugee Women Association (2004), Refugee Women’s News, March-April 2004, Issue 27 
63
Pieke, Frank (2004) Chinese Globalization and Migration to Europe, CCIS (The Centre for Comparative 
Immigration Studies) Working Paper No. 94, March. 
Raghuram, P. and Kofman, E. (2002) ‘The state, skilled labour markets and immigration: the case of doctors 
in England’, Environment and Planning A, vol 34, pp 2071–89. 
Ryan, L., Sales, R., Tilki, M. and Siara, B. (2007) Recent Polish Migrants in London: social networks, 
transience and settlement Final Report to ESRC. 
Sales, R. (2002) ‘The deserving and the undeserving: refugees, asylum seekers and welfare in Britain’, Critical 
Social Policy, vol 22, no 1, pp 456–78. 
Sales, R. (2007) Understanding immigration and refugee policy Bristol: the Policy Press 
Sales, R. and Gregory, J. (1998) ‘Refugee women in London: the experience of Somali women’, Refuge,
Journal of the Centre for Refugee Studies, vol 17, no 1, pp 16–20.  
Sales, R., D’Angelo., A., Liang, X. and Montagna, N. (2008) ‘London’s Chinatown: branded place or 
community space?’ in S. Donald, E. Kofman and C. Kevin Branding Cities and Cultural Borders: 
Cosmopolitanism, Parochialism, and Social Change London: Routledge (in press). 
Sales, R., Lam, T., D’Angelo, A., Lin, X. and Montagna, N. (2008) Changing Chinese Communities in 
London: new migration, new needs Report of research funded by the Big Lottery Fund. Social Policy 
Research Centre, Middlesex Unviersity (forthcoming). 
Salt, J. (2007) International Migration. Report of the United Kingdom, SOPEMI Correspondent to the 
OECD 
Sassen, S. (1991) Global city: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Schnapper, D. (2007) Qu'est-ce que l'intégration ? Paris: Folio Actuel 
Schoorl, J.J. (2005) ‘Information needs on stocks of migrants for research on integration’, paper submitted 
by NIDI (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute), UNECE/Eurostat, Working Paper No. 5 
Somerville, W. (2006) ‘Success and failure under Labour: Problems of priorities and performance in 
migration policy JCWI Immigration Rights Project London: JCWI. 
Soysal, Y. (1994) Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Spencer, S. (ed) (2006), ‘Refugees and other new migrants: a review of the evidence on successful 
approached to integration’, Report Commissioned by the Home Office, COMPAS Working Papers
Tilki, M., D’angelo, A., Ryan, L. and Sales, R. (2008) The forgotten Irish Report of research funded by the Fund 
for Ireland, UK. London: Fund for Ireland 
Vertovec, S. (2006) ‘The emergence of super-diversity in Britain’, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society 
(COMPAS) Working Paper 25. 
Yuval Davis, N. (1997) ‘Ethnicity, gender relations and multiculturalism’, in P. Werbner and T. Modood 
(eds) Debating cultural hybridity, London: Zed. 
Zaronaite, D. and Tirzite, A (2006), The Dynamics of Migrant Labour in South Lincolnshire, EMDA and 
Lincolnshire Enterprise 
64

	

&		
&

	$	
Integration: a working definition 
Integration has become central to European Union and national policies on managed migration. However, to those 
attempting to study this concept, integration is a complex issue and even its definition poses difficulties. Although 
most people have a general understanding of the term, its actual definition is anything but unambiguous, because it 
refers to a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, which affects several different areas of the migrants’ life. 
Moreover, the debate on integration, in particular in relation to its meaning and measurement, is influenced by the 
diversity of political ideas on this subject. Generally speaking, whilst at European Union level there has an attitude of 
openness, particularly towards labour migration and especially since the Tampere summit in 1999, individual states 
appear to be still bound to policies of prudence and closure. This political and institutional context assumes greater 
importance since a key element in the development of programmes to promote integration is the attempt to identify 
reliable parameters to measure this phenomenon, in order to test the effectiveness of current policies and adjust 
future policies. 
This issue has become even more complex since the assimilationist approach which characterised most European 
countries in relation to the post-war mass migration was superseded in the 1970s. It became clear then that 
integration is not so much about cultural homogeneity, as about maintaining the cultural identity of immigrants. 
Through keeping links with their countries of origin, migrants tend to recreate and nourish their culture within the 
‘host’ society. This change from a stubborn insistence on a mono-cultural society to that of multiculturalism has 
revolutionised the policies and the very idea of integration, raising issues which cannot be addressed in simplistic or 
univocal ways. Far from being mechanically assimilated within a society or a ‘national’ culture (each national culture 
is already made up of several social and cultural groups), migrants maintain an identity which is structurally and 
inevitability ‘other’. This makes it necessary to promote new forms of dialogue, exchange and interaction between the 
different cultural actors within society, so that, with time, the various European societies can reshape their structures 
and institutions in order to become truly intercultural.  
This debate has become even more intense after the terrorist attacks of September 11th against the Twin Towers in 
New York, but also because of the central role now played by issues such as citizenship and notions of shared 
values. The issue of defining the conditions under which migrants can become part of the host countries has revived 
the debate on integration in relation to the prerequisites to the granting of citizenship and the system of duties and 
rights on which it is based. In order to acquire citizenship, in fact, applicants are now required to subscribe a set of 
values which, whilst on one hand are the foundation of all democratic states, on the other reflect national peculiarities 
arising from its specific national history.  
The problematic and conflictual nature of this debate shows that we are still from developing a unanimous, or at least 
widely shared, definition of integration. A first step in this direction took place in June 2003, with the European 
Commission’s Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (COM 2003/336). A response to the 
1999 European Council in Tampere, this document also took into account the 2000 ‘Lisbon Agenda’ agreed at the 
summit of European leaders in the Portuguese capital. European countries set out the aim, for the next ten years, of 
expanding economic growth and employment in order to make the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge 
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”. Thus, at the beginning of the Third Millennium, the EU document engaged with the issues of the full and 
equal inclusion of migrants in the European labour market and, highlighting its strong link to social inclusion, 
encouraged the revision of integration policies both at EU and national level and the provision of some indicators on 
which it could be promoted.
The document defines integration as a “a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of 
legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant. This 
implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants 
are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural and civil 
life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate 
actively in the integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity”. The communication was followed 
shortly by a report for the European Commission ‘Benchmarking of Immigrant Integration’ by researchers at 
ERCOMER in the Netherlands (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003). This study aimed to explore the concept of 
integration and to assess how some aspects could be measured “in a way that enables comparison between Member 
States, groups of immigrants, and also over time”. The report distinguished between two major elements of 
integration: a structural dimension, involving participation in the major institutions of a society, such as the labour 
market, education and health care system; and cultural dimension or ‘acculturation’ which it described as the 
changes in immigrants’ cultural orientation and identification. For the purpose of benchmarking the report identified 
four ‘domains’ of integration: socio-economic; cultural; legal and political; and the attitudes of the recipient society. 
Possible indicators were suggested for each domain, although in a very general and cautious way, recognising that 
many indicators may lead to ambiguous interpretation.  
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To make just one significant example, housing concentration may reflect ghettoisation but may also suggest that 
there is a sufficiently large community which may provide support to its members. This also reflects differences 
between the agendas of assimilation and multiculturalism. 
In 2004 a formal, shared definition of integration became the basis of a common EU strategy, when the member 
states adopted a set of Common Basic Principles (CBP) in relation to migrants’ integration at the Council of Europe 
on 19 November. These principles stated that: integration is a dynamic, two way process of mutual accommodation 
by all immigrants and residents of Member States; integration implies respect for the basic values of the European 
Union; employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the 
contribution immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contribution visible. Integration was also seen 
as related to: basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions; efforts in education for 
immigrants and particularly their descendants; frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens; 
participation of immigrants in the democratic process.  
Within this framework, states were seen as playing a role in providing: access for immigrants to institutions as well as 
to public and private goods on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way; safeguarding 
practices of diverse cultures and religions (unless they conflict with other EU laws); mainstreaming integration policies 
at all relevant levels of government and public services. These principles were seen, for all member states, as on the 
one hand a major policy driver for the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda, and on the other hand as the basis on 
which to explore how EU, national, regional and local authorities could interact in the development and 
implementation of integration policies. Governments were expected to develop clear goals, indicators and evaluation 
mechanisms to adjust policy and evaluate progress towards them.  
In this spirit, and in the light of the above mentioned definitions developed at European level, the MITI project 
developed a working definition of integration, to be used as a basis to identify and analyse indicators: Integration is 
the condition (and process) of feeling a full and active member of the society in which one lives, having the means 
and opportunities to participate, as far as one chooses, in the wider social and cultural context.  To facilitate this 
process it is necessary to provide conditions such as: rights - both formal access to social, civil and political rights, 
and substantive access to rights (e.g. non-discrimination, freedom from harassment);  the ability to act independently
– based on the knowledge of language/structures of society (e.g. how to access services); the material resources to 
participate in all aspects of life within the community (e.g.  adequate housing, employment appropriate to 
skills/qualifications, access to education and health); extensive local networks (social/emotional and instrumental); a 
sense of belonging and trust (with the ability to choose to maintain, adapt and reject aspects of cultural traditions from 
country of origin/host country, and with the presence of national/ethnic groups ‘taken for granted’ and visible within 
the mainstream). 
Areas of analysis and the local dimension 
Measuring migrants’ integration, in particular for third country nationals, within different European countries is an 
ambitious and problematic task. It means dealing with a social and political notion which encompasses different 
themes and can have different meanings and different connotations in relation to different countries. It is therefore 
necessary to acknowledge all the dimensions of this phenomenon (at the same time a condition and a process) which 
is by definition ‘human’, and thus ‘qualitative’. Its measurement, if we exclude qualitative research based on sample 
surveys, is possible only through attempting to interpret the statistical dimension through the use of data which has a 
significant relation to this phenomenon and can therefore be used as indicators of integration. 
It is on this basis that the transnational MITI project identified three main areas of analysis within which to measure 
the potential for integration of migrants in each partner country, both at national and regional level. Moreover, each 
national partner focused on one major metropolitan area: the Province and Metropolitan District of Rome, (Provincia e 
Comune di Roma) in Italy, the metropolitan area of Barcelona in Spain, the metropolitan area of Lisbon in Portugal, 
the Paris region (Ile de France) in France and the London area (Greater London) in the United Kingdom.  
The possibility of translating these three thematic areas into indices was explored by each partner and some partners 
developed the following three: 1) Index of absorptive capacity, measuring the capacity of a local area to attract and 
keep a sizable foreign population; 2) Index of social stability, measuring the level of social inclusion and adaptation in 
each local area; 3) Index of Labour Market, measuring the level and type of inclusion of migrants in the local labour 
market.  For each index, a number of statistical indicators were identified, based on their validity, reliability, 
completeness (availability at all local levels) and comparability. 
Definition of ‘immigrant’ and comparative analysis 
From the early stages of the project, there were two important methodological choices in relation to the identification 
and construction of indicators. The first concerns the population under investigation: the aim was to define precisely 
the term ‘immigrant’ (an ambiguous term whose meaning varies significantly across countries) and to identify, within 
this group, the sub-group more relevant to our project. There are many ‘technical’ definitions of ‘immigrant’ and at 
least three emerged from within the research group: a definition based on foreign nationality (particularly relevant for 
countries with a relatively recent migration history); a definition based on country of birth (which does not necessarily 
correspond to citizenship); a definition based on ethnicity (used in the British context in particular). Moreover, national 
statistical sources use one of several of these approaches to construct their data, making international comparison 
even more difficult. 
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The research team decided to adopt the criterion of foreign citizenship and, since the European programme INTI 
focuses on “Preparatory Actions for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals”, it was decided to take into account 
non-EU citizens only. Only when the available data does not allow to disaggregate this specific section of the 
population, was the general ‘foreign’ population used. 
The second specific choice of the MITI project concerned the comparative methods used to construct the indicators. 
Whilst in the Italian experience of the CNEL Reports - which was the starting point of this project - indicators had 
always been statistical data disaggregated for each local area and related exclusively to the immigrant population 
based there, the transnational research team, in the laborious task of adapting the Italian methodology to the other 
partner countries involved, agreed to adopt a different approach. In order to place in context the level of 
socioeconomic integration of third-country nationals in each region, it was decided to compare the situation of third 
country nationals with that of nationals for each indicator, in order to understand the gaps between the two groups in 
each area. 
In this way each indicator, and the ranking of its values, was constructed not just from data on the immigrant 
population but on the basis of the gap between this data (restricted to citizens of third countries) and that referring to 
the national population (or as an alternative, to total population, including nationals and foreigners). This was done in 
the two main possible ways: the relative one (the gap between non-EU immigrants and nationals – or the total 
population – in the same region) and the absolute one (the gap between non EU immigrants within each region and 
the average national level for nationals or the total population). 
The first, comparing the local situation of non EU foreigners to that of the nationals in the same region, shows that 
sometimes, given the same local conditions, the former may manage better than the latter – in the areas covered by 
the indicators – even in regions of the country which are in overall terms more disadvantaged than others. In this 
comparative way the ranking of regions is sometimes very different from that when the data is based solely on 
immigrants themselves, demonstrating the actual capacity for integration of foreigners even in more difficult local 
conditions. The second approach, which compares the local situation of non-EU immigrants with the national average, 
is more influenced by the structural differences at local level and thus produces different values for each region. 
On the one hand, this comparative method works together in a fruitful way with the original one, because it helps us to 
understand, for each significant element of integration represented in the chosen indicators, how far the situation of 
the non-EU population differs, in positive or negative terms, from the ‘structural’ situation of the national (or total) 
population. On the other hand, though, this criterion presents some limitations, both conceptual and methodological.  
From the conceptual point of view, underlying this method is the assumption (more or less implicit) that for non-EU 
immigrants the minimum basis for integration, in each element measured by the indicators, should be the average 
condition of the national population. Now, it is clear that this assumption is problematic since in areas with serious 
structural problems, where large sections of the local population experience socioeconomic disadvantage (shortage of 
basic services, lower quality of live, inadequate or inaccessible housing, lack of work, insufficient support structures, 
etc.) it is very difficult to argue that the average standard of living there could represent the basis (even the minimum) 
on which one could describe immigrants as integrated. 
Paradoxically, in these cases it would be necessary to ask whether nationals themselves are ‘integrated’, i.e. whether 
the local conditions are able to guarantee living standards sufficient for the local population to be considered 
‘integrated’. This is linked to the complex issue of defining what we really mean by ‘integration’ and under what 
conditions any person, immigrant or local, can be considered ‘integrated’ in his/her own local area. On the other hand, 
even when we take the average national standard of living of the local population as denominator, this does not 
necessarily correspond to a point of reference which is either credible or desirable in terms of integration (a basis for 
migrants’ integration), since it is the average of very different local situations within the country.  
Although it took into account all these difficulties, strictly linked to the problematic concept of integration, the 
transnational team of the MITI project decided to use this comparative method in the construction of the indicators. 
Taking in consideration what was explained above, this choice was based on three elements: the basis of comparison 
here used (i.e. average conditions of nationals, either at local or national level) is a conventional point of reference; we 
cannot attribute any absolute value to the results but, as has already suggested, an indicative one; to correctly 
interpret such results, they need to be read together with the basic regional data used to construct the indicators. 
These considerations impact on the possibility of comparing indicators between countries. Indeed, since the average 
national level of the local population differs between states, we lack a common base of comparison across the 
different countries, a single term of reference which could render the data of the various partner countries comparable. 
Thus one can only compare the results in relative terms, limiting the possibility of making transnational comparisons of 
the regional differences. 
The grid of indicators 
As already observed, the development of the grid of indicators was particularly time-consuming because it was not 
possible to obtain from official data sources (national and international) all the data which was originally chosen as the 
best representation of the selected indicators. This problem arose from either from the inadequacy of the necessary 
statistics (the data were not disaggregated by region or were not available for all the countries involved in the 
research) or because the required data was totally unavailable. For this reason, it became inevitable that the research 
team had to review the initial grid, to modify and adapt it in according to the data which was available disaggregated 
by region, as necessary for this project. It was thus decided, depending on individual cases, either to substitute the 
data for some indicators with others relating to the same subject which could (though more indirectly) provide relevant 
information for that indicator; or, within the same index, to substitute some indicators for those related to other topics 
which were relevant to that index; or to remove altogether certain indicators due to a lack of relevant data on that 
issue.  
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The efforts of the team to make up for these structural weaknesses as far as possible were extremely fruitful. The 
search for the necessary data and the checking of its availability brought to light a range of local, national and 
international sources. In many cases, statistics were obtained which were not published within the public domain, but 
required tenacity and patience and specific requests to the institutions holding the data.  In some cases, it was 
necessary to pay for data. The research team thus worked with a rich and original range of data; this in itself 
represents a valuable outcome of this work.  
The following final grid of indicators was developed from the results of this research: 
1. Index of absorptive capacity 
1.1. Indicator of the size of the foreign population (foreign residents in a region as % of the national total). 
1.2. Indicator of the foreign proportion of the population (foreign residents as % of total population of the 
region). 
1.3. Indicator of the increase in the foreign population (% change in the foreign population in a region over a 
10-year period). 
1.4. Indicator of long-term residence (% of foreign population resident in the country for at least 5 years or, 
for those countries where this data is not available, for at least 10 years). 
2. Index of social stability 
2.1. Indicator of poor housing (% of the foreign population living in overcrowded housing): a) gap between the 
regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; b) gap between the regional figure for 
non-EU nationals and regional figure for nationals. 
2.2. Health indicator (% of total population suffering from some form of disability): a) gap between the 
regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; b) gap between the regional figure for 
non-EU nationals and regional figure for nationals. 
2.3. Indicator of mixed marriage: a) gap between the regional marriage rate for immigrants (number of 
marriages per year in each region, in which at least one partner is a non-EU national per 10,000 residents) 
and the national marriage rate of nationals (number of marriages per year in the country, in which at least 
one partner is a national per 10,000 residents); b) % of mixed marriages (partners of different nationalities) 
per year as a proportion of total marriages, for each region. 
3. Labour Market Index 
3.1. Indicator of Unemployment (unemployment rate: the unemployed as a % of the labour force): a) gap 
between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; b) gap between the regional 
figure for non-EU nationals and regional figure for nationals. 
3.2. Indicator of sectoral distribution of activity (% of non-nationals and nationals in each sector, for each 
region). 
3.3. Indicator of occupational status of the immigrant labour force (the proportion of workers in the highest 
three occupational groups, based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations-ISCO of the 
International Labour Organization-ILO): a) gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the 
average for nationals; b) gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and regional figure for 
nationals. 
3.4. Educational level of the foreign labour force (% of people with a university degree in the labour force): a) 
gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; b) gap between the 
regional figure for non-EU nationals and regional figure for nationals. 
3.5. Indicator of immigrant activity rate (% of the labour force in the 15-74 aged population): a) gap between 
the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; b) gap between the regional figure for 
non-EU nationals and regional figure for nationals. 
3.6. Income level of immigrants (annual gross per capita income in Euros for each region): a) gap between 
the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; b) gap between the regional figure for 
non-EU nationals and regional figure for nationals. 
At this stage we must bear in mind at least two issues concerning this grid. Firstly, in relation to indicator 3.3 
(occupational status) for countries where the statistics were available, data on occupational status was cross-
tabulated with that on educational level (university degree). In these cases, the indicator was based on: a) gap 
between the % of non-nationals with a university degree in a high status occupation – first three ISCO categories – in 
each region compared with the national % for nationals; b) gap between the rates for non-nationals and nationals in 
each region. Secondly, for those countries for which it was possible, the data for 3.5 (immigrant activity rate) were 
enriched by disaggregating them by gender, while for 3.6 (immigrant income) they were disaggregated by sector of 
activity, occupational status and educational level. 
It is also important to bear in mind that, in order not to lose the fresh insights from other relevant data which could not, 
however, be included in the common grid (because it was incomplete, its relation to integration was more ambiguous 
or its availability was more limited for the majority of national partners), it was agreed to consider that statistical data 
which was available. This was used purely for descriptive purposes but it increased the value of the investigation of 
this multidimensional phenomenon on which this project focused. These could be defined as ‘contextual indicators’ 
and related to following areas: citizenship acquisition; family reunion; crime and discrimination; trade union 
membership; accidents at work; school enrolment.  
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It should be stressed that the research group agreed to leave a certain (limited) margin of flexibility to partners in using 
the data most relevant to their own national situation in relation to the common grid of indicators. This concerned mainly 
the second and third indices (those acknowledged to be more directly related to integration) and it was agreed taking into 
account the significant differences in reliability and availability of the data for each indicator in different countries.  
In some few cases, then, partners were allowed to include one of the contextual indicators in the national grid if the data 
was sufficiently complete and significant for their own country. This choice was made taking in consideration that if, on 
the one hand, it was acknowledged that this reduced the transnational comparability of the results (comparability which 
was already limited, as observed in the Introduction, by the structural differences between countries in the available 
datasets), on the other hand this choice allowed each partner to carry out his national research as adequately as 
possible on the basis of the more available and significant statistics within his own national situation. Anyway, each 
partner will highlight in his national Report the differences between his own national grid and the common one described 
here, explaining the reasons of the different choices when there will be the case. 
The scales of the indicators and case studies of particular national groups 
For each indicator of the main grid, a ranking was drawn up comparing regions of each country on the basis of their 
relative values (numerical or percentage) starting from the maximum value at the top to the minimum at the bottom. The 
values were standardised using a method which is known in the academic literature as conversion to ‘percentage score’: 
this consists in organising the regional data for each indicator into a same predetermined scale (scoring from 1 to 100), 
according to the procedure illustrated below. In this way it is possible to bring different kind of data, related to different 
phenomena (as those of the different indicators), into a common scale. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the scale, each was subdivided into 5 levels of intensity on the basis of point 
scores: 1 to 20, minimum; 21 to 40, low; 41 to 60, average; 61 to 80, high; 81 to 100, maximum
9
. 
It is important to make some observations on the organisation of the indicators into a ranking list. Firstly, as can be 
observed, some of the indicators used are ‘negative’ in that they have an inverse relation to integration (thus the lower 
the value, the greater the potential for integration). In these cases, therefore, the corresponding regional ranking was 
constructed in the opposite way: the top region was the one with the highest negative gap between immigrants and 
nationals and the bottom that with the lowest negative gap; thus, in the standardisation of the values, the first would have 
the highest score (100) and the second the lowest (1). This was the case in relation both to some indicators included in 
the system, like housing conditions (rate of overcrowding), health (rate of disability) and unemployment, and for 
contextual indicators like crime or discrimination and accidents at work. Secondly, it must be pointed that for indicator 3.2 
(distribution by sector of activity), although part of the system of principal indicators, it is not possible to develop a 
regional ranking nor therefore to standardise the values. This indicator was not therefore useable in the construction of 
the index and it was used as a descriptive tool which provided relevant informations.  
Finally it should be pointed out that, as a result of discussions within the research team, it was agreed to include in the 
national reports a case study of certain of the most important national groups of non-nationals resident in each partner 
country. The main aim was to enrich the project’s results by investigating the specific forms of integration experienced by 
these groups. The following national groups were included: for Italy, Chinese, Moroccans, Polish and Rumanians; for 
France, Chinese, Moroccan, Portuguese and Turks; for Portugal, Brazilians, Cape Verdeans, Chinese, British, and 
Ukrainians; for the United Kingdom, Australians, Bengali, Chinese and Polish; for Spain, Peruvians, Chinese, 
Columbians, Ecuadorians, Moroccans and Rumanians.  
  
Transformation into standardised values: a joint method 
As already stated, the method used to standardise the values of the indicators is known in the literature as conversion to 
‘percentage score’. This consists of converting the data for each indicator into the same score scale, from a minimum of 
1 to a maximum of 100, distributing scores for intermediate absolute values in proportion to the distance of these 
absolute values in the ranking; and, above all, independently of the fact that the original ranking may consist of all 
positive, or all negative values or a mixture of the two.  
This standardisation method facilitates a transnational comparison. Indeed, the standardised values that we obtain in this 
way have no measurement unit and no magnitude and, in general, this make possible the comparisons among countries 
even when the type of data used for the same indicators, or the range of the original data, are different among countries. 
The method also facilitates the possibility to construct composite indicators, since in this way standardisation always 
produces positive values.  
This method modifies only partially the one originally proposed by the project leader IDOS, which is also valid from a 
scientific point of view and has been used regularly in the annual CNEL reports on Indices of Integration of Immigrants in 
Italy. The difference lies in the fact that the scale of standardised values in the CNEL reports awards, in the ranking, a 
score of zero to data which have either a negative or zero value.  
                                                          
9
 In this way, giving each level a different colour (from the darkest for the maximum level to the lightest for the minimum, with 
intermediate shades for the other levels and reserving the darkest for the top of the scale), it was possible to map the regional 
differences for each country in order to have a graphical representation of the regional distribution of the pheonemona represented by 
the indicators. Nevertheless, for reasons connected to the timetable of the project and the difficulty of obtaining blank regional maps in 
electronic form, on which the data could be inserted for each partner country, it was not possible to implement this graphical 
representation in all cases. 
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This procedure is based on the assumption that, for the different type of data used (which refers exclusively to the 
immigrant population, in accordance with an absolute criterion, and not to the difference from the national population, 
according to the comparative criterion of the M.I.T.I. project), zero or negative values do not satisfy the type of 
information which the indicator is intended to measure. In other words, they do not reflect the phenomenon of which the 
indicator is a proxy, since they represent the absence of the phenomenon iteself (zero) or its opposite (negative value): in 
both cases the phenomenon of which data was assumed to be the indicator has no positive ‘consistency’ and thus is 
translated into a score of zero. 
In the M.I.T.I. project, however, since the indicators were constructed on the basis of a different criterion (the 
comparative one, that considers gaps between immigrants and nationals), the possibility of gathering negative values 
was structurally connected and does not mean that the phenomenon has no positive ‘consistency’. Thus it was 
important, both for comparability and to allow the construction of composite indicators, to develop a method which could 
still be used where the values were, partly or wholly, negative
10
. 
It was this property of the conversion to ‘percentage score’ which was the basis for the decision to retain it as the final 
reference point in the standardisation of the indicators, even when it was agreed to include a second method. This was 
based on comparing the gaps between the regional data for immigrants and that for nationals – for the latter considering, 
as described above, both the average national level (a) and the regional data (b) – with the mean square deviation. But it 
is important to point out that this conversion of data to standardised gaps, although confirmed in academic literature and 
technically practicable, does not resolve the problem of homogenizing the indicators for the construction of an index 
(composite indicator) and also for the possibility to compare them in an adequate way. Indeed the standardised values 
that we obtain, since they are gaps, can still be (for the same indicators) either positive or negative. And this would 
complicate both the comparability of the indicators and the possibility to construct indeces, for which purpose it is 
desirable to have only positive values.  
For these reasons, after weighing up the characteristics and advantages of the two methods of standardisation, it was 
finally agreed to apply the conversion to ‘percentage score’ method (with the advantages explained above) to the 
standardised gaps. Thus a joint procedure was developed and used in which the standardisation of the absolute gaps, 
using the formula which places them in relation to the mean square deviation
11
, became the basis for their transformation 
into a ‘percentage score’ scale, on which we can base both the comparison of indicators and the construction of indeces 
(composite indicators). The standardisation procedure thus consists of two phases: the first places the original absolute 
gaps, on which we construct the rankings for each indicator, in relation to the mean square deviation
12
, transforming 
these into standardised gaps (score 1); the second applies the following formula
13
 to the standardised gaps in order to 
transform them into percentage scores (score 2). 
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 It is interesting to note that the extremes l and L of the standardised scale (in this case  l=1 and L=100) can be fixed conventionally in 
the way which is most useful for the research: both positive (the standardised values are always positive, whatever the sign of the 
original data), which is the case here; but, needing, also both negative (the standardised values are always negative); or the lowest 
value (l) negative and the highest (L) positive (the standardised values are both positive and negative). 
11
a = (regional data for immigrants – national average for nationals) / mean square deviation; b = (regional data for immigrants – 
regional data for nationals) / mean square deviation. 
12
 As known, the mean square deviation is obtained by calculating the arithmetic mean of all the individual values of the the considered 
variable (here: the regional values in the ranking list of each indicator); thus, for each individual value, the deviation from this mean; then 
squaring all the deviations, calculating the arithmetic mean of the squares of the deviations (this quadratic mean of the deviations 
constitutes, as known, the variance) and finally calculating the square root of this quadratic mean. 
13
 In this formula: l=1, L=100, iX  is the individual value of the variable X  for region i  (here: a regional standardised gap of a certain 
indicator) and ix  is the corresponding transformed value (percentage score) of the standardised gap.
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The MITI project was distinct in analysing integration at regional level and in its method of constructing indicators 
based on the comparison between non-EU foreign population and nationals. Each partner collected the most 
recent statistics available relevant to integration and organised them in a coherent framework based on a common 
method of analysis. This has allowed the mapping of the strengths and weaknesses of each region in relation to the 
wider context in which it is based (the local situation compared to the national; the national context compared to 
that of the other EU countries involved). These regions in some cases correspond to local administrative areas. 
Each national report from the project is therefore a useful analytical tool which can be used by the general public as 
well as by academics, stakeholders and policymakers. 
As far as the general public is concerned (and in particular students, the voluntary sector and all those working on 
immigration and social issues), the wide range of data and information provided about migrants’ integration can 
certainly enhance awareness of the structural issues of their local area. Such awareness is the indispensable 
precondition for the exercise of active and responsible citizenship and for taking part in and keeping a watchful eye 
on the management of the delicate process of the integration of immigrants within the local socio-economic context. 
This objective is even more important for those working in the field of migration since as ‘experts’ in this area, they 
will be able to develop their commitment and activities on the basis of wider understanding. This understanding, 
could, however, become part of more general discussion and debate creating a stronger synergy between the 
various actors in order to coordinate their activities and initiatives at local level. 
Finally, we hope that this resource will be particularly useful to those who, at different levels (welfare policy makers, 
local authorities and local organisations), have to make decisions and implement policies concerning the integration 
of immigrants. This tool will helps policy makers to assess the efficacy of policies (planned or implemented) based 
on the actual dimensions of local needs, allowing them to adjust their choices in the light of this knowledge without 
ideological preconceptions or demagogic interpretations of a phenomenon which is often misrepresented by the 
media.  
On the basis of its joint work, the research team has developed a series of suggestions and recommendations as a 
result of the difficulties which emerged in the collection of data to construct the indicators and on the basis of 
discussions about how the results can best used by researchers, policy makers and the voluntary sector. These 
difficulties required, as discussed above, several revisions and adjustments of the common framework. Each 
partner has also developed their own recommendations which are geared to their own national audience. 
Strongly connected to these issues and, more generally, to the specific nature of this research project, a definition 
of good practice was developed. Good practice was identified – on the basis of the transnational research 
experience of the MITI project – as those elements which are transferable and sustainable and can thus be used in 
relation to migrants’ integration in a range of different contexts. 
Recommendations 
The general recommendations of the MITI project can be summarised as follows: 
• The need for better availability, completeness and traceability of statistics to enable more detailed knowledge 
at local level. As has been observed, the main difficulty encountered by the transnational research team, after 
having drawn up the list of indicators of integration which it planned to use, was the need to change and adapt 
it several times, replacing some indicators with others or discarding them completely, because it was not 
possible to get the relevant data from the statistical sources identified, either at national or European level. In 
some cases this was because the required data was not collected and in others it was not made available from 
the data source (or only on payment). In other cases data were not available disaggregated by region and in 
others the dataset was not complete, with data available at national level and for some regions only. In some 
cases the data was deemed unreliable, for example when it was the result of a sample survey and so for the 
smallest regions the figures were too small to be reliable). Such limitations forced us to fall back on a list of 
indicators which was less complete and thus less able to fully comprehend the phenomenon at local level. This 
weakened the results of the project and, therefore the development of a policy instrument.  
• The need for a method to collect and process data which is homogeneous between different local and 
administrative levels (national, regional, metropolitan) and between different sources, according to criteria 
which meet the needs of researchers and policy makers. Strongly linked to the problems mentioned above is 
the issue of the comparability of the available data at the different regional levels or for different phenomena. 
This means for example that within the same country the national data is sometimes not consistent with the 
same data at regional or metropolitan level, because the former may be based on the legally resident 
immigrant population and the latter on the local registers of
71
residents population; or the data for a particular aspect may be related to a different population from that used in 
another, for example one may be collected on the basis of nationality and the other on country of birth or 
ethnicity. In each case the root of the problem is the diversity in the data collection and analysis used by different 
national and local sources. Moreover, the method of collecting and organising data used by the data source 
sometimes does not correspond to the needs of researchers and policy makers for detailed and precise 
information about the current situation, both to strengthen their analysis and to inform their strategies. 
Good practice 
In relation to these practical recommendations which emerged from the actual difficulties the research team had to 
deal with, it was possible to identify some examples of good practice which could be transferred to other situations. 
These can be summarised as follows: 
• The development (or enhancement) of local observatories on migrants’ integration, which can monitor this 
phenomenon through a common system of indicators (both quantitative and qualitative) which has been 
discussed and tested beforehand. In this way the main aim of the MITI project could be incorporated at the 
institutional level. This would allow the academic and methodological experience gained in this one-off research 
project to be integrated into the normal activities of the relevant local bodies in each country appropriately 
coordinated through a common national system. 
• Active involvement of immigrants in the definition, adjustment and validation of the indicators of integration used, 
in particular to identify hidden problems or unexpressed needs and to assess the relative importance of each 
indicator selected, in order to tailor the measurements to the particular local features of the immigrant population.
The statistical tools used to measure migrants’ integration are limited both in that integration cannot be 
understood only at a quantitative level and in the different relative weights to be given to the various  aspects of 
integration which these indicators measure. Their weight also varies in different regions and in relation to the 
characteristics of the migrant population (length of residence, sex, age, socio-economic condition, etc.). In order 
to create a reliable measurement at local level, it is necessary to weight the indicators appropriately within the 
standardised scoring system. This procedure was not included in the MITI project, rather it was assumed that 
each indicator had the same weight in relation to integration and therefore all the figures could be transformed 
into a scale 1 to 100. It would, however, represent an interesting development of the methodology and a way in 
which integrate the purely quantitative statistical indicators with a qualitative dimension involving immigrants 
themselves in the judgement of these indicators. Such an integrated method would allow us to adjust the list of 
indicators based on what the migrants themselves see as priorities and to add to the overall measurement of 
integration a series of issues and unexpressed needs which are not represented at the purely statistical level. 
• The establishment by local authorities of advisory committees, including immigrants, community workers, 
researchers, community organisations and representatives of public bodies and organisations, in order to 
develop more effective policies for integration and for the evaluation of these policies in relation to identified 
needs. The major objective of national research activities such as those of the MITI project is to involve 
stakeholders and experts as much as possible in order that, on the basis of shared and reliable information, they 
can develop proposals which will assist in the better management of integration, an issue which is fundamental 
to the cohesion of society as a whole. 
It is evident that the recommendations for good practice are merely very practical and specific applications of the 
issues arising from the research carried out by the network, both in relation to its own working methods and as an 
objective which should be enhanced and extended in future work. The network is in fact one of the best ways to 
manage the complexity of the society we live in. In the social context, and in particular in relation to issues related to 
immigration, it is important that this is reflected above all in our ways of thinking, seeing ourselves in relation to others 
and to the wider world, so that one can really reap the expected results both at the level of research and practice.  
